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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States government has demonstrated heightened
self-awareness that it is a nation addicted to opioids. “National public
health emergency,” “unprecedented epidemic,” “national crisis”—it
has self-declared its state of opioid addiction, the equivalent of the
nation introducing itself at a twelve-step meeting with, “I am the U.S.,
and I am an opioid addict.” As the National Institutes on Health
(“NIH”) summarized:
Opioid addiction, misuse and overdose is an ongoing and
rapidly evolving public health crisis. An estimated 2
million Americans are addicted to opioids, and
approximately 25 million suffer daily from chronic
pain. Following a rapid increase in rates of opioid pain
reliever prescribing, widespread use and misuse of these
medications has risen at an alarming rate, giving way to
a nation-wide crisis. Heroin use and addiction are now
on the rise as some people shift from prescription opioids
to their cheaper street relative. For Americans under 50
years of age, drug overdose is the leading cause of
death.1
Through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(“CDC”) and other authorities, the U.S. has documented its addiction
empirically, and the numbers resonate deafeningly. Some of the
sharpest are that the number of annual opioid prescriptions written in
the U.S. now roughly equals the number of adults in the U.S.
population.2 There were almost 19,000 overdose deaths in the U.S. in
1. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., NIH Opioid Initiative to Help End
the Opioid Crisis, NAT’L INSTS. ON HEALTH, https://www.nih.gov/node/34206 (last
updated Dec. 8, 2017).
2. See NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT OF DRUG-RELATED RISKS
AND OUTCOMES: UNITED STATES, 2017, at 9–11 (2017) [hereinafter CDC, ANNUAL
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2014 associated with prescription opioids (approximately fifty-two
daily), and more than 50,000 in 2015 and 64,000 in 2017—most of
which involved opioids.3 Even more troubling, the number is
escalating “faster than ever.”4 In fact, deaths in the U.S. from opioid
overdoses now exceed the number of deaths caused by motor vehicle
accidents. 5 The pain, suffering, and financial harm attributable to the
opioid crisis that individuals, families, and communities throughout
the country have endured is vastly more expansive, ongoing, and
spreading.6
This Article addresses the U.S. government’s responsiveness to
the opioid crisis thus far, with a focus on achieving true national
recovery. After profiling the scope of the U.S. opioid epidemic in Part
II, the discussion in Part III centers on government responsiveness to
the prescription opioid problem. Key U.S. government agencies have
recognized the importance of intra-agency, interdisciplinary
(particularly at the nexus areas among government agencies,

SURVEILLANCE],
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/pubs/2017-cdc-drugsurveillance-report.pdf; see also CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
GUIDELINE FOR PRESCRIBING OPIOIDS FOR CHRONIC PAIN : IMPROVING PRACTICE
THROUGH RECOMMENDATIONS (2017) [hereinafter CDC, PRESCRIBING GUIDELINE],
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/guidelines_factsheet-a.pdf (describing some
of the risks associated with therapeutic prescription opioid use); Robert M. Califf,
Janet Woodcock & Stephen Ostroff, Special Report: A Proactive Response to
Prescription Opioid Abuse, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1480, 1480 (Apr. 14, 2016)
(internal citations omitted), https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMsr1601307;
Prescribing Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/prescribing.html (last updated Aug. 30,
2017).
3. Exec. Order. No. 13,784, Establishing the President’s Commission on
Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,283 (Mar. 29,
2017) [hereinafter Commission Exec. Order]; Califf, Woodcock & Ostroff, supra
note 2, at 1480–81, 85; David A. Kessler, Opinion, How to Fight the Opioid Crisis,
N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/opinion/fightopioid-crisis.html.
4. Kessler, supra note 3.
5. Gillian Mohney, Deaths from Opioid Overdoses Now Higher Than Car
Accident
Fatalities,
HEALTHLINE
(Mar.
30,
2018),
https://www.healthline.com/health-news/deaths-from-opioid-overdoses-higher-thancar-accident-fatalities#1 (comparing mortality rates associated with opioid overdoses
and vehicle collisions, respectively, in 2016).
6. See, e.g., Commission Exec. Order, supra note 3.
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biopharmaceutical R&D, and clinical medicine), and governmentindustry collaboration as essential for national opioid addiction
recovery. There are shortcomings, however, that make responsiveness
with the levels of efficacy and efficiency so direly needed—what
recognition of “national public health emergency” status of the opioid
epidemic underscores—questionable.
In Part IV, the Article proposes that the U.S. more fully,
directly, and aggressively embrace its legacy of jolting the existing
forefront of science forward through a government-academia-industry
“triple threat” with the potential of placing the opioid crisis on the
nation’s continuum of enormous challenges that it has overcome. This
continuum spans from splitting the atom to save democratic society
during WWII, to landing a man on the moon during the Cold War, to
mapping the human genome, and beyond. The Article concludes that,
to realize a treatment plan sufficiently responsive to the nation’s
prescription opioid crisis, the U.S. must utilize the governmentacademia-industry trilogy as aggressively as it has in the past, with
centralized leadership and sufficient funding, to conquer otherwise
insurmountable challenges.
II. ADDICTION BY PRESCRIPTION
While stretching to reach the corner of the vaulted ceiling in her
client’s mid-century living room, Sydney loses her balance, falls off
the ladder, and ends up flat on her back, sprawled on the terrazzo floor.
Seth, running into Publix Super Market to pick up some baby formula
during one of the afternoon showers so typical in Southern Florida,
slips in the store aisle and falls on his hip, which will require surgery.
Although fictitious scenarios, Sydney and Seth represent the
millions of Americans who use prescription opioids annually for
legitimate pain management. “Over the course of a given year,
approximately 100 million people in the United States suffer from
pain. . . . while the remainder have short-term pain from injuries,
illnesses, or medical procedures.” 7 Reflective of opioids’ highly
addictive nature, the number of people who become addicted to them,
beginning with legitimate prescription use, is astounding. 8 Moreover,

7.
8.

Califf, Woodcock & Ostroff, supra note 2, at 1480.
See, e.g., CDC, ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE, supra note 2, at 13.
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that number increases exponentially when patients do not use those
prescriptions as written, and, in sync with expansion of the addiction
epidemic, when someone other than the person for whom a caregiver
writes an opioid prescription uses the drug. 9 As the President’s
National Commission on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid
Crisis reports relayed, four out of every five new heroin users first use
prescription opioids.10 Although illicit trade of heroin and fentanyl
increasingly feeds the nation’s opioid addiction, according to the CDC,
“20 percent of patients who receive an initial 10-day prescription for
opioids will still be using” (or at least receiving) them after a year.11
Current physician opioid-prescribing practices evolved from a
1990s movement to better control pain with assurances from the
pharmaceutical industry that patients would not become addicted to
prescription opioid pain relievers, and reliance on the same pain
medications for decades. 12 Coordination between the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”) and Drug Enforcement Administration
(“DEA”)—implementation of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act and
the Controlled Substances Act—to control spillage from prescription
opioid use for legitimate pain purposes into uses beyond has failed

9.
10.

Id. at 48–49.
THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON COMBATING DRUG ADDICTION AND THE
OPIOID CRISIS, FINAL REPORT 28, 117 (2017) [hereinafter COMM’N FINAL REPORT],
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/Final_Report_Draft
_11-1-2017.pdf; THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON COMBATING DRUG ADDICTION AND
THE
OPIOID
CRISIS,
DRAFT
INTERIM
REPORT
3
(2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/ondcp/commission-interimreport.pdf [hereinafter COMM’N INTERIM REPORT].
11. Katie Thomas & Charles Ornstein, Amid Opioid Crisis, Insurers Restrict
Pricey, Less Addictive Painkillers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/17/health/opioid-painkillers-insurancecompanies.html.
12. See generally Ronald Melzack, The Tragedy of Needless Pain, 262 SCI.
AM. 27 (1990) (proposing that morphine taken solely to control pain is not addictive,
and that, worldwide, patients are undertreated and suffer unnecessary agony); see also
Nat’l Institutes on Health, Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE,
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis (last updated
Mar. 2018); Andrew Rosenblum et al., Opioids and the Treatment of Chronic Pain:
Controversies, Current State, and Future Directions, 16(5) EXP. CLIN.
PSYCHOPHARMACOL.
405
(Oct.
2008),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2711509/pdf/nihms97365.pdf.
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miserably. 13 According to the CDC, although from 1999 to 2014 there
was no reported change in pain, U.S. sales of prescription opioids
almost quadrupled. 14 Moreover, as the FDA recognizes, physicians
have been prescribing opioids without a sound knowledge base about
them and addiction and, for children, without clinical data.15
While U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) research on the matter is ongoing, according to preliminary
findings, insurers and pharmacy benefit managers have been making
opioids more accessible than less addictive prescription alternatives
and other non-prescription pain management treatments, such as
physical therapy.16 Market reality is that opioids, especially when
available as generic drugs, are cheap relative to safer alternatives. For
example, according to analysis by The New York Times:
• “UnitedHealthcare, the nation’s largest health insurer,
places morphine on its lowest-cost drug coverage tier
with no prior permission required, while in many cases
excluding Butrans. And it places Lyrica, a non-opioid,
brand-name drug that treats nerve pain, on its most
expensive tier, requiring patients to try other drugs
first.”17
• “[R]estrictions remain prevalent in Medicare plans, as
well. Drug plans covering 33.6 million people include
Suboxone, but two-thirds require prior authorization.
Even when such requirements do not exist, the out-of-

13.
14.

See generally infra Section III.C.2.
Infra Section III.C.2. See also CDC, ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE, supra note

2.
15. Califf, Woodcock & Ostroff, supra note 2.
16. Thomas & Ornstein, supra note 11.
17. Id. (“The Drug Enforcement Administration places morphine in a higher
category than Butrans for risk of abuse and dependence. Addiction experts say that
buprenorphine also carries a lower risk of overdose.”). Butrans is a pain-relief skin
patch that contains buprenorphine, which is generally recognized as a less-risky
opioid—including a lower risk of overdose. See generally Butrans, PURDUE PHARMA,
https://butrans.com/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2018).

2018

The U.S. Science and Technology “Triple Threat”

1033

pocket costs of the drugs are often unaffordable
. . . .”18
• “Only one-third of the people covered [under Medicare
prescription drug plans insuring 35.7 million people in
the second quarter of 2017], for example, had any
access to Butrans. And every drug plan that covered
lidocaine patches, which are not addictive but cost
more than other generic pain drugs, required that
patients get prior approval for them. In contrast,
almost every plan covered common opioids and very
few required any prior approval.”19
Moreover, with demand so high, opioids have been extremely
profitable for their manufacturers and, accordingly, manufacturers
have in turn marketed them aggressively—and, at times, unlawfully.
One of the most infamous examples is Purdue Pharma’s marketing of
OxyContin, which made the company the subject of a 2007 lawsuit for
unlawful marketing brought by twenty-seven state attorneys general
and resulted in a $20 million settlement. 20 In a separate federal action,
Purdue Pharma paid $600 million.21 Three of its executives pled guilty
to misbranding the drug, were ordered to pay $34.5 million, and were
sentenced to three years of probation and 400 hours of community
service. 22 The DEA case against the McKesson Corporation is another
noted example. 23
Pharmacy benefit managers, drug wholesalers, physicians, and
drug manufacturers have become the subjects of myriad legal actions,
and those are multiplying. 24 On February 27, 2018, Attorney General

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Laura Strickler, Drugmakers May Face More Legal Action Over Opioid
Epidemic,
CBS
NEWS
(Sept.
1,
2016,
5:39
PM)
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/oxycontin-opioid-drug-makers-legal-action/ (last
visited Aug. 19, 2018); see generally infra Section III.C.2.
21. Strickler, supra note 20.
22. Id.
23. See generally infra Section III.C.2.
24. See infra Section III.C.2. See also Lenny Bernstein & Scott Higham, “We
Feel like our System was Hijacked”: DEA Agents Say a Huge Opioid Case Ended in
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Jeff Sessions announced a new Justice Department task force
dedicated to fighting the opioid epidemic by targeting drug
manufacturers and distributors whose overselling of prescription
painkillers have fueled the opioid crisis, and assistance to existing state
and local lawsuits doing the same. 25
III. A GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION DIAGNOSIS
The CDC has compiled, and continues to impressively compile,
empirical data in an ongoing manner to define the U.S. opioid
crisis26—a contribution essential for self-awareness and to formulate
effective, timely intervention strategies. Acknowledgement of the
crisis has triggered a blitzkrieg of national and state programs and
funding reactions sprawled among HHS, more than a dozen federal

a
Whimper,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
17,
2017,
9:31
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/mckesson-dea-opioidsfine/2017/12/14/ab50ad0e-db5b-11e7-b1a8-62589434a581_story.html; 60 Minutes:
The Biggest Opioid Case in U.S. History (CBS television broadcast Dec. 17, 2017)
[hereinafter 60 Minutes: Biggest Opioid Case] (interviewing former assistant special
agent David Schiller who, having served the agency for more than thirty years, headed
the DEA investigation of McKesson); Strickler, supra note 20. For updated
information on the states’ class action, see Opioid Lawsuits, CLASS ACTION.COM,
https://www.classaction.com/opioids/lawsuit/ (last updated Jan. 5, 2018). In addition,
“[t]he New York State attorney general’s office sent letters last week to the three
largest pharmacy benefit managers—CVS Caremark, Express Scripts and
OptumRx—asking how they were addressing the crisis.” Thomas & Ornstein, supra
note 11. CVS responded by announcing prescription limits, effective February 1,
2018. See generally Press Release, CVS Health, CVS Health Fighting National
Opioid Abuse Epidemic with Enterprise Initiatives (Sept. 21, 2017),
https://cvshealth.com/newsroom/press-releases/cvs-health-fighting-national-opioidabuse-epidemic-with-enterprise-initiatives (“This program will include limiting to
seven days the supply of opioids dispensed for certain acute prescriptions for patients
who are new to therapy; limiting the daily dosage of opioids dispensed based on the
strength of the opioid; and requiring the use of immediate-release formulations of
opioids before extended-release opioids are dispensed.”).
25. Dan Mangan, Attorney General Jeff Sessions Announces New Opioid Task
Force to Target Drug Manufacturers, Distributors Who Fuel Prescription Painkiller
Epidemic, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/27/attorney-general-jeff-sessionsannounces-new-opiod-task-force.html (last updated Feb. 27, 2018, 3:39 PM).
26. See CDC, ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE, supra note 2; CDC, PRESCRIBING
GUIDELINE, supra note 2.
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agencies, professional medical organizations, and states. 27 In 2016,
Congress authorized approximately $1.2 billion to support many of
these efforts through the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act
and the 21st Century Cures Act, and now has bolstered such initiatives
further through $6 billion over the next two years appropriated under
the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018.28
Unfortunately, these efforts and associated funding do not
amount to the meaningful intervention needed to realistically contain
and reverse the ongoing and spreading epidemic: a tightly orchestrated
intervention with defined and measurable objective priorities,
centralized and accountable leadership, and secured funding sufficient
to realize those objectives. As former FDA Commissioner David
Kessler, who served under both Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill
Clinton, commented:
Unfortunately, no one in the federal government has
taken the lead to support the testing of new approaches
to this epidemic. Such an effort would include new ways
to prevent the illicit use of prescription drugs and to
establish methods of treating addiction. The President’s
Commission on Combating Opioid Drug Addiction and
the Opioid Crisis has come up with nearly
60 recommendations that are thoughtful and useful, but
responsibility falls across so many federal agencies that
little progress is likely to result. 29

27. See infra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. See generally U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ASPE ISSUE BRIEF : OPIOID ABUSE IN THE U.S. AND
HHS ACTIONS TO ADDRESS OPIOID -DRUG RELATED OVERDOSES AND DEATHS (Mar.
26, 2015), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/107956/ib_OpioidInitiative.pdf
(surveying actions among the agencies within HHS and primary state actions). The
remainder of this Article identifies and discusses myriad such responses to the opioid
epidemic. See generally Section IV.
28. See Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-123, 132 Stat. 164 (2018);
Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. 114-198, 130 Stat. 695
(2016). See infra notes 121–123 and accompanying text.
29. Kessler, supra note 3.
OF
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A. The Administration’s Responsiveness to
“Real (Opioid Crisis) News”
Juxtaposed against the reality and severity of the opioid crisis,
the Trump Administration’s repeated acknowledgements of the
epidemic and the dire need for interventions amount to little more than
a hollow, haunting echo. The Trump Administration did formulate a
National Commission on Combatting Drug Addiction and the Opioid
Crisis (“National Commission”) and launched its work in July 2016. 30
President Trump also declared the opioid crisis a “national public
health emergency” on October 26, 2017 with powerful words that
captured the essence of the opioid threat to the nation:
This epidemic is a national health emergency. . . .
Nobody has seen anything like what is going on now. . . .
As Americans we cannot allow this to continue. It is
time to liberate our communities from this scourge of
drug addiction. Never been this way. We can be the
generation that ends the opioid epidemic. We can do it. 31
Yet the President mentioned the opioid epidemic only in
passing during his State of the Union address just three months later,
and, as former FDA Commissioner Kessler observed on January 14,
2018:
[T]here is no permanent head of the Drug Enforcement
Administration. The president’s nominee for “drug
czar” to run the White House Office of National Drug
Control Policy withdrew from consideration in October
and no replacement has been named. The acting chief of
staff and general counsel for that office was
dismissed [in December 2017].32

30. See Commission Exec. Order, supra note 3.
31. Dan Merica, What Trump’s Opioid Announcement Means—and Doesn’t
Mean,
CNN
(Oct.
26,
2017,
9:11
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/26/politics/national-health-emergency-nationaldisaster/index.html.
32. Compare President Donald J. Trump’s State of the Union Address, THE
WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
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Moreover, despite his words capturing the severity of the
epidemic, its dire impact on the nation, and the crucial need to contain
and reverse the crisis, President Trump’s “national public health
emergency declaration” fell short of declaring the opioid epidemic a
national state of emergency. Such status would have triggered a
source of immediate federal funding relief under the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (“Stafford Act”) by
tapping into funds from the Federal Emergency Management
Agency’s Disaster Relief Fund. 33 President Trump also has chosen not
to use his authority under the Public Health Services Act to provide the
immediate, targeted, and secured funding over time needed to combat
the crisis as the CDC defines it. 34
To the contrary, the Administration has engaged in a persistent
attack on the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), infusing a hurricane of
uncertainty in the health insurance markets, which translates into
higher premiums to buffer against the epidemic. 35 Most notably, the
Administration has announced slashing subsidies and state Medicaid
funding expansion under the ACA—estimated at $1–2 trillion over ten
years—to offset tax cuts, largely directed towards corporate
America.36 As former FDA Commissioner Kessler observed, “[s]teep
statements/president-donald-j-trumps-state-union-address/ (transcript), with Kessler,
supra note 3.
33. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L.
No. 100-707 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207 (2000)). See
generally Merica, supra note 31.
34. See Merica, supra note 31.
35. Peter Lee, who runs the nation’s second largest ACA health care exchange
in California, made this point vividly on CNN when interviewed in fall 2017.
According to Mr. Lee, the ACA has been working extremely well, but the instability
and uncertainty associated with efforts to dismantle key provisions of the ACA, most
notably the individual mandate, has jeopardized the law, chilled insurers, and forced
them to raise rates to account for uncertainties and associated risks. Can Obamacare
Survive Without Individual Mandate?, CNN: TRANSCRIPTS (Nov. 16, 2017, 7:30
AM), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1711/16/nday.04.html. Mr. Lee
emphasized that cost-sharing subsidies have more than offset increases in costs, and
the net effect of the individual mandate, the penalties for which have been nominal
(“a nudge”), has been to change people’s behavior, including Medicaid subscribers,
to shop for coverage. Id.
36. Abby Goodnough, Rush to Impose Medicaid Curbs Creates Unease, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2018, at A1, A14; Tammy Lubby, Not Even the White House Knows
How Much It’s Cutting Medicaid, CNN MONEY (May 24, 2017, 12:13 PM),
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cuts have been proposed for Medicaid, the largest single insurance
program covering opioid addiction treatment, which will further
impede access to substance abuse treatment.” 37 Moreover, the federal
government is adhering to a policy of revenue neutrality (increases and
decreases in tax revenue must be coupled with commensurate offsets),
and the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act has been estimated to generate a
loss of $1.5 trillion in tax revenue over the next decade. 38
Nevertheless, in early 2018, the Trump Administration declared a
commitment to bolstering the U.S. nuclear arsenal and overall military
capabilities. 39
President Trump donated his third-quarter 2017 salary,
approximately $100,000, to the HHS to combat the opioid crisis. 40
Some presumably received the gesture as compassionate and
http://money.cnn.com/2017/05/24/news/economy/medicaid-budgettrump/index.html; Senate Plan Threatens Health Programs, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federalbudget/senate-budget-plan-threatens-health-programs.
37. Kessler, supra note 3.
38. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, REPORT ON ESTIMATED REVENUE
EFFECTS OF THE CHAIRMAN’S AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R.
1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT,” SCHEDULED FOR MARKUP BY THE COMMITTEE ON
WAYS
AND
MEANS
ON
NOVEMBER
6,
2017
(2017),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5027. Supporters of the
tax cuts challenge these estimates under theories that the cuts will stimulate the
economy, though such economic responsiveness is subject to undefined time and
speculative. Jim Tankersley, Republicans Sought to Undercut an Unfavorable
Analysis
of
the
Tax
Plan,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
4,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/us/politics/republicans-joint-committee-ontaxation-estimate.html.
39. Matthew Yglesias, Congress Still Isn’t Taking the Opioid Crisis Seriously,
VOX
(Feb.
9,
2018,
8:00
AM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/2/9/16991340/opioid-funding-budget-deal.
In contrast with the
additional $6 billion appropriated to combat the nation’s addiction to opioids, the
Budget Act of 2018 boosted military spending with an additional $160 billion. Id.;
see also William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, Trump Plans for Nuclear Arsenal
Require $1.2 Trillion, Congressional Review States, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/31/us/politics/trump-nuclear-weapons-arsenalcongressional-budget.html.
40. Christina Wilkie, Trump Donates Third-Quarter Salary to HHS to Combat
Opioid
Epidemic,
CNBC
(Nov.
30,
2017,
6:55
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/30/trump-donates-third-quarter-salary-to-hhs-tocombat-opioid-epidemic.html.
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supportive—the interpretation shared by his press secretary, Sarah
Huckabee Sanders, when she and colleagues announced the
donation.41 One could forgive the many of the millions of Americans
who have been directly impacted by opioid addiction, otherwise have
heightened awareness of the crisis, and who are actually engaged in
combatting it, if they share a very different interpretation. The
President’s gesture, in the absence of at least a demand to Congress for
a meaningful, national infusion of targeted resources over a block of
time on par with the crisis, was empty—if not outright insulting.
B. A Reality Check on Agency Responsiveness
Myriad federal agencies and national professional medical
organizations, along with HHS, engage in opioid crisis interventions.
Vested entities include the CDC, the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (“CMS”), the Center for Substance Abuse and
Treatment (“CSAT”), the DEA, the FDA, the NIH, the National
Institute on Drug Abuse (“NIDA”), the Office of National Drug
Control Policy (“ONDCP”), and the Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration (“SAMHSA”). 42 Professional medical

41. Melanie Arter, Trump Donates Salary to HHS to Combat Opioid Crisis,
CNS
NEWS
(Nov.
30,
2017,
8:06
PM
),
https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/melanie-arter/trump-donates-salary-hhscombat-opioid-crisis.
42. See generally, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS
ROADMAP TO ADDRESS THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC (2018), https://www.cms.gov/AboutCMS/Agency-Information/Emergency/Downloads/Opioid-epidemic-roadmap.pdf;
CDC, Opioid Overdose (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/;
Medication-Assisted Treatment, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS.
ADMIN., https://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assisted-treatment (last updated Feb. 7,
2018); Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, The Opioid Crisis, THE WHITE HOUSE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/key-issues/prescription-opioid-misuse/
(last
visited Aug. 19, 2018); Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE,
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis
(last
updated Mar. 2018); Robert M. Califf, Comm’r Food & Drugs, U.S. Food & Drug
Admin., FDA Charge to the Committee: FDA Opioid Action Plan and Incorporating
the Broader Public Health Impact into the Formal Risk-Benefit Assessment for
Opioids
(July
6,
2016),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/newsevents/speeches/ucm510139.pdf; Robert W.
Patterson, Acting Admin., Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice/Drug Enforcement
Administration Press Conference Announcement of New Tools to Address Opioid
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organizations that are leading the charge against the crisis include the
American Academy of Pain Medicine (“AAPM”) and the American
Medical Association (“AMA”). 43 HHS has assembled an Interagency
Pain Research Committee (“IPRC”) to promote synergy among federal
agencies. 44 The FDA and HHS leadership are seeking collaboration
with industry and the medical profession to respond to the opioid
epidemic and to advance pain management science and clinical
understanding.45 NIH Director Francis Collins and NIDA Director
Nora D. Volkow, after engaging in dialogue with global
biopharmaceutical leaders to explore government-industry
collaboration, released an initial plan in 2017. 46 Two high priorities
emerged: (1) a short-term goal to expand the portfolio of medication
options to treat opioid use disorders, prevent and reverse overdoses,
and support long-term patient recovery; and (2) a longer-term research
and development goal to introduce safe, efficacious non-addictive pain
relievers, including non-opioid analgesics. 47
The HHS and individual agency responsiveness, interagency
collaboration, and collaboration among government, the medical
profession, industry, and academia are laudable and essential.
Nevertheless, these efforts are not enough. Treating, containing, and
reversing the opioid crisis are beyond the resources and operating
norms of HHS and the government agencies responsible for doing so,
as former FDA Commissioner Kessler observed:

Crisis
(November
29,
2017),
https://www.dea.gov/pr/speechestestimony/2017t/112917t.pdf.
43. See,
e.g.,
Opioids
Research,
AM. ACAD. PAIN MED.,
http://www.painmed.org/library/research/opioids/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2018);
Reversing the Opioid Epidemic, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.amaassn.org/delivering-care/reversing-opioid-epidemic (last visited Aug. 19, 2018).
44. Mashana Davis, Identifying Opportunities for Synergy, INTERAGENCY
PAIN
RESEARCH
PORTFOLIO
(May
7,
2014,
11:13
AM),
https://paindatabase.nih.gov/content/identifying-opportunities-synergy;
NIH
Initiative to Help End the Opioid Crisis, NAT’L INSTS. ON HEALTH,
https://www.nih.gov/opioid-crisis (last visited Aug. 19, 2018); Interagency Pain
Research Coordinating Committee, https://iprcc.nih.gov/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2018).
45. Califf, Woodcock & Ostroff, supra note 2.
46. See generally Nora D. Volkow & Francis S. Collins, The Role of Science
in Addressing the Opioid Crisis, 377 N. ENGL. J. MED. 391 (2017).
47. Id. at 393.
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White House czars are largely ineffective because
they do not control the agency heads who are legally
responsible for carrying out the various congressional
mandates of the czars. Historically, the relevant agency
heads don’t pay much attention to czars. There is a
world of difference between someone whose authority is
to coordinate and someone who has the true authority to
impose change. Moreover, the president’s drug control
policy office has been more heavily focused on law
enforcement than on public health strategies.
The many federal agencies that work on this crisis
live largely in their own worlds. Funding for opioidrelated activities is under the control of multiple
departments, including the Department of Health and
Human Services and the Justice Department, both of
which are criticized as operating with blinders with
respect to coordination and accountability.48
C. The Supply Side of the Prescription Opioid Problem
There are several obvious, potential controls on the supply of
prescription opioids, which currently enables responsible pain
management and feeds the opioid addiction epidemic. The FDA, the
market gatekeeper and sentinel for prescription medications, is
responsible for determining whether prescription opioids meet safety
and efficacy standards, and under what conditions they are market
eligible.49
Physicians, licensed under state law to write the
prescriptions, directly make opioids available to patients. To meet
prescription demands in accordance with FDA regulations and DEA
Aggregate Production Quotas (“APQs”), industry manufactures
opioids, and distributors and pharmacies dispense them, in compliance
with the DEA’s Diversion Control Division (“DCD”). 50 DCD’s
48. Kessler, supra note 3.
49. See generally MICHAEL J. MALINOWSKI, HANDBOOK ON BIOTECHNOLOGY
LAW, BUSINESS, AND POLICY 127–37 (2016); see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 351–360fff-7
(2012) (setting forth the FDA’s authority over pharmaceutical products and
establishing statutory requirements for various prescription and over-the-counter
products).
50. See infra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
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mission “is to prevent, detect, and investigate the diversion of
controlled pharmaceuticals and listed chemicals from legitimate
sources while ensuring an adequate and uninterrupted supply for
legitimate medical, commercial, and scientific needs.” 51
The
Controlled Substances Act authorizes and mandates that the DEA set
APQs:
When Congress passed the Controlled Substances
Act (CSA), the quota system was intended to reduce or
eliminate diversion from “legitimate channels of trade”
by controlling “the quantities of the basic ingredients
needed for the manufacture of [controlled substances].”
The purpose of quotas are to provide for the adequate
and uninterrupted supply for legitimate medical need of
the types of schedule I and II controlled substances that
have a potential for abuse, while limiting the amounts
available to prevent diversion. DEA establishes APQs
for more than 250 Schedule I and II controlled
substances annually.52
1. Shackles on the Market Sentinel
The FDA has responded directly to the opioid crisis since the
1990s, and the agency has scaled up its efforts substantially over the
last several years as the epidemic has amassed and spun increasingly
out of control. 53 For example, the FDA has promoted the market
introduction and use of opioids with abuse-deterrent properties—

51. Diversion Control Div., About Us, U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN.,
https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/Inside.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2018).
52. Press Release, U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., DEA Reduces Amount of Opioid
Controlled Substances to be Manufactured in 2017 (Oct. 4, 2016),
https://www.dea.gov/press-releases/2016/10/04/dea-reduces-amount-opioidcontrolled-substances-be-manufactured-2017; accord Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 801(2012)) (regulating the manufacture, importation,
possession, use, and distribution of defined and scheduled substances).
53. Timeline of Selected FDA Activities and Significant Events Addressing
Opioid
Misuse
and
Abuse,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/ucm338566.htm
(last updated Aug. 6, 2018) [hereinafter FDA, Timeline].
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notably extended-release (“ER”) and long-acting (“LA”) opioids. 54 In
2012, the agency introduced a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
Strategies (“REMS”) program for ER/LA opioids, which includes
voluntary training for prescribers, 55 and issued a draft guidance in
2013, which it finalized in April 2015. 56 Consequently, ER/LA opioids
with abuse-deterrent properties and enhanced safety measures
(including a stronger FDA post-marketing presence and development
of methods to evaluate and mitigate safety issues) have become
available since 2015—as of January 2017, the FDA had already
approved nine ER opioid analgesics—and with increasing frequency.57
In 2016, three FDA physician leaders, Robert M. Califf, Janet
Woodcock, and Stephen Ostroff, published a thoughtful, expansive,
and proactive opioid intervention strategy in The New England Journal
of Medicine.58 In their words,
We are launching [a] renewed effort in the context
of a broad national campaign that includes a major
initiative led by the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) designed to attack the problem from
every angle. . . . [S]imply reinforcing opioid-related
activities that are within the FDA’s traditional
regulatory scope will not suffice to stem the tide.
Instead, we must work more closely with key federal
54. See Califf, Woodcock & Ostroff, supra note 2, at 1482.
55. The REMS program enhances the post-marketing obligations of
manufacturers and requires them to fund continuing medical education (“CME”) to
raise provider understanding about these products. Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
Strategy (REMS) for Opioid Analgesics, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/informationbydrugclass/ucm163647.htm (last
updated Feb. 27, 2018). As of April 2016, more than 38,000 prescribers had taken
part in these programs. Califf, Woodcock & Ostroff, supra note 2, at 1482.
56. See generally CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ABUSE-DETERRENT
OPIOIDS—EVALUATION
AND
LABELING
(2015),
https://www.fda.gov/ucm/groups/fdagov-public/@fdagov-drugsgen/documents/document/ucm334743.pdf.
57. For example, on January 17, 2017, the FDA approved Vantrela ER, which
has physical and chemical properties that make intravenous abuse more difficult,
though still with some risk of abuse by nasal and oral delivery routes. FDA, Timeline,
supra note 53.
58. See generally Califf, Woodcock & Ostroff, supra note 2.
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agencies (including many within HHS), the clinical and
prescriber communities, and other stakeholders to ensure
that all available effective tools are brought to bear on
this epidemic and that the evidence base for proper pain
management and appropriate opioid use is optimized and
translated into practice.59
The FDA’s primary methodology is to significantly enhance and fully
utilize evidence-based medicine in the field of chronic pain treatment:
The FDA does its best work when high-quality
scientific evidence is available to assess the risks and
benefits of intended uses of medical products.
Unfortunately, the field of chronic pain treatment is
strikingly deficient in such evidence . . . .
Recognition of this problem led the FDA, several
years ago, to require industry to perform a series of
studies on questions that are critical for ensuring safe
prescribing. For example, until recently it was believed
that opioids’ pain-relieving properties would not be
time-dependent, but new studies have raised the question
of whether opioids continue to be effective or may even
increase pain in some patients after several months of
use. To explore this question, 1 of the 11 postmarketing
studies the FDA is requiring industry to fund is a clinical
trial in which participants are randomly assigned to
continue opioid therapy or to be weaned from it on a
schedule over the course of 1 year of follow-up. 60
Even before this national campaign announcement, the FDA
reached out to the National Academy of Medicine to draw upon
evidence-based medicine to improve its “regulatory framework for
opioid review, approval, and monitoring.” 61 While encouraging and
embracing research and development of ER/LA opioids, the agency
has mandated that they come with “strict, detailed instructions” and
descriptions of their associated risks, and adhere to sufficient ongoing

59.
60.
61.

Id. at 1480–81 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1484.
Id. at 1482.

2018

The U.S. Science and Technology “Triple Threat”

1045

monitoring measures. 62 The FDA makes clinical use of ER/LA opioids
contingent on exhausting other pain management measures and
requires that they “be dispensed in limited quantities.” 63
Beyond ER/LA opioids, the FDA also is collaborating with NIH
and industry to develop pain-alleviating medication alternatives that
do not have the addictive properties of opioids, and nonpharmacologic
approaches to pain treatment. “The FDA has approved nonopioid
medications for treatment of various chronic-pain syndromes,
including gabapentin (Neurontin), pregabalin (Lyrica), milnacipran
(Savella), duloxetine (Cymbalta), and others, and a number of
promising development programs are in the pipeline.” 64 The FDA also
has concentrated resources and expedited review and approval to make
medications that can reverse overdose, such as naloxone, available. 65
When the FDA’s physician leaders relayed their proactive
intervention strategy, however, they readily acknowledged that a
comprehensive, timely solution is beyond the agency’s purview:
A comprehensive solution to the current opioid
crisis goes well beyond the FDA’s remit. . . .
Accordingly, we are supporting the CDC’s Guideline for
Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain. . . . We are also
supporting the Surgeon General’s efforts to engage the
clinical community in a concerted approach to curbing
inappropriate prescribing and proactively treating opioid
addiction, while reinforcing evidence-based approaches
to treating pain in a manner that spares the use of opioids.
Until clinicians stop prescribing opioids far in excess of
clinical need, this crisis will continue unabated. 66
Although the FDA is the U.S.’s primary market sentinel for
prescription opioids, physicians write the prescriptions that provide
patients with access, and industry provides the supply. According to
the CDC, the latter two have been far from judicious. 67 Deference to

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.; see also supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text.
Califf, Woodcock & Ostroff, supra note 2, at 1482.
Id. at 1483.
Id.
Id. at 1484 (emphasis added).
See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
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the practice of medicine and legitimate patient need for pain
management stunt the FDA’s reach into physician prescribing
practices. FDA deference to the practice of medicine is deeply
entrenched: “During the twentieth century, FDA pursued a policy of
not regulating physicians.”68 For example, in 1925, the Supreme Court
unanimously overturned the conviction of a physician for prescribing
drugs to addicts in violation of the Harrison Act, a predecessor of the
Controlled Substances Act.69 The Court held, “[o]bviously, direct
control of medical practice in the States is beyond the power of the
Federal Government.”70
The agency’s authority and market-sentinel responsibilities
came into being under the scrutiny of an organized and leery medical
profession—a powerful, largely self-regulating presence on both
national and state levels. 71 Due primarily to resistance from the
medical profession, the U.S. did not expand the FDA’s standard for

68. Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm: The
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
419, 509 (2010); cf. Anny Huang, FDA Regulation of Genetic Testing: Institutional
Reluctance and Public Guardianship, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 555, 579 (1998)
(“Although there are dependable grounds for asserting statutory jurisdiction, FDA
must be wary of encroaching on medical practice.”) Cf. also generally Michael J.
Malinowski, Doctors, Patients, and Pills—A System Popping Under Too Much
Physician Discretion? A Law-Policy Prescription to Make Drug Approval More
Meaningful in the Delivery of Health Care, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1085 (2012)
[hereinafter Malinowski, Doctors, Patients, and Pills] (challenging the scope of
physician discretion to engage in off-label use of prescription drugs).
69. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L. 91-513,
84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2012))
(regulating the manufacture, importation, possession, use and distribution of defined
and scheduled substances); Harrison Narcotics Tax Act, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914)
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 4702–4900 (2012)) (taxing drugs such as
cocaine and morphine that effectively became a prohibition on them).
70. Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925). Although Linder
subsequently has been mostly overruled or superseded, the Court relied on the case’s
rationale in Gonzales v. Oregon, in which it upheld physician discretion to prescribe
FDA-approved drugs in compliance with Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act. See
generally Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
71. See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE (1982) (examining how the roles of doctors, hospitals, health plans, and
government programs in patient care have evolved over the last two-and-a-half
centuries).
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review and approval to include even efficacy until 1962.72 Moreover,
it did so with assurances of maintaining deference to the practice of
medicine—for example, continuing to give physicians considerable
discretion over the clinical use of approved prescription drugs,
including at times expansive off-label uses wholly removed from the
clinical data the FDA relied upon to put them on the market. 73 When
the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 (“FDAMA”) 74 overhauled the
agency decades later, Congress reiterated and reinforced this
assurance. The House Report that accompanied FDAMA expressly
and decisively declared, “FDA has no authority to regulate how
physicians prescribe approved drugs in the context of their medical
practice. Physicians prescribing off-label uses of approved drugs is
not within the jurisdiction of the FDA.” 75
Consistent with this position, the U.S. Supreme Court has
protected physician discretion to prescribe, including permissive offlabel prescribing. For example, in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal
Committee,76 the Court found that “fraud-on-the-FDA” claims
challenging off-label promotion were preempted implicitly because
they would discourage off-label uses and impede the FDA’s obligation
to self-restrain from interfering with the medical profession’s
judgments.77 The Court also has upheld physicians’ discretion to
prescribe FDA-approved pain medications, even in a manner that
intentionally ends life when permitted under state law. 78 In sum,
“[p]hysicians hold extraordinary discretion to prescribe drugs that

72. Id. at 127–34; Milestones in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, U.S. FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm2007256.htm
(last
updated Feb. 1, 2018) (“Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments passed in 1962 to ensure
drug efficacy and greater drug safety.”).
73. See Malinowski, Doctors, Patients, and Pills, supra note 68, at 1104–05.
74. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (1997), Pub. L. No.
105-115, 111 Stat. 2296.
75. H.R. REP. NO. 105-310, at 60 (1997).
76. 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
77. Id. at 350–51.
78. See generally Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).

1048

The University of Memphis Law Review

Vol. 48

reach pharmacy shelves off label regardless of limits to the scope of
clinical data that puts them there.” 79
A related traditional constraint on the FDA is industry sponsors’
discretion (recognized as a right of corporate citizens) to shape the
scope of the applications for market access they submit to the agency—
which invites streamlining applications and supportive clinical
research, and then coupling approvals with the pursuit of more
expansive market uptake through off-label uses. 80 This practice has
perpetuated a dearth of pediatric clinical data for many medications
commonly used to treat children, including opioids. 81 While the Best
Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (“BPCA”) introduced incentives for
conducting pediatric studies for products already approved and some
funding for the FDA to get studies conducted when product
manufacturers refuse, 82 the FDA holds limited authority under the
BPCA to mandate them. 83 Fortunately, the Pediatric Research Equity
Act (“PREA”) has enabled the FDA to require industry sponsors to
conduct certain studies to ascertain appropriate medication dosing in
children.84 “Before BPCA and PREA became law, more than 80% of
the drugs approved for adult use were being used in children, even
though the safety and effectiveness had not been established in

79. Michael J. Malinowski, Throwing Dirt on Doctor Frankenstein’s Grave:
Access to Experimental Treatments at the End of Life, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 615, 636
(2014) [hereinafter Malinowski, Throwing Dirt].
80. MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES 135–155 (2005)
(“No one should rely on a business for impartial evaluation of a product it sells.”).
Many of these restraints are supported by the wide body of jurisprudence rejecting
the Lochner era in American history (1897–1937), during which the Supreme Court,
conservative but very judicially active, struck down state business and market
regulations based on its own policy conclusions. See generally HOWARD GILLMAN,
THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED : THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE
POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993).
81. Califf, Woodcock & Ostroff, supra note 2.
82. Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (2007), Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115
Stat. 1408 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355a (2012)).
83. Malinowski, Doctors, Patients, and Pills, supra note 68, at 1125–26.
84. Pediatric Research Equity Act (2007), Pub. L. No. 108-155, 117 Stat. 1936
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355c (2012)).
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children. [By August 26, 2013,] that number ha[d] been reduced to
about 50%.”85
Still, doctors have continued to prescribed opioids to children
without a foundation of pediatric data. As the FDA has observed,
“[c]hildren with serious conditions are being treated with opioids in
the absence of adequate knowledge about correct indications and
dosing.”86 Accordingly, the agency is using its Pediatric Advisory
Committee to address the use of opioid medications in children,
including compilation of evidence to guide treatment and pediatric
labeling for opioids. 87
The FDA’s proactive opioid intervention strategy underscores
the importance of physician opioid education, which the agency has
been advancing through its REMS CME program. Persistent FDA
caution about encroaching on the practice of medicine, however,
restrains even this program: “[W]hile FDA has jurisdiction over the
pharmaceutical industry, it does not have jurisdiction over the medical
profession and, thus, claims not to interfere with the exchange of
purely scientific information between pharmaceutical manufacturers
and doctors.”88 So while the agency mandates ER/LA opioid
manufacturers to make CMEs available under the REMS program,
physician participation thus far is voluntary—though the FDA
supports mandatory education for prescribers. 89
As the FDA recognizes in its call for collaboration, at least
implicitly, given the institution’s innate restraints in regulation of the
practice of medicine, other federal agencies and the clinical medicine
85. Lynn Yao, FDA Takes Steps to Encourage Pediatric Drug Studies, FDA
VOICE (Aug. 26, 2013), https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/tag/pediatricresearch-equity-act-prea/.
86. Califf, Woodcock & Ostroff, supra note 2, at 1484.
87. Id. at 1483–84.
88. Peggy Chen, Education or Promotion?: Industry-Sponsored Continuing
Medical Education (CME) as a Center for the Core/Commercial Speech Debate, 58
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 473, 473 (2003) (internal citations omitted).
89. “FDA continues to support mandatory education for prescribers, as called
for in the 2011 Prescription Drug Abuse Prevention Plan and reemphasized in the
2014 National Drug Control Strategy.” Califf, Woodcock & Ostroff, supra note 2, at
1482. Accord OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT,
NATIONAL
DRUG
CONTROL STRATEGY 72–73
(2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/ndcs_2014.pdf
(emphasizing education as a pillar of the strategy).
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community are positioned more favorably, jurisdictionally and
substantively, to champion mandatory education measures beyond
labeling and post-marketing evaluation and safety measures consistent
with the REMS program. 90 Measures centered squarely in physicianpatient decision-making, such as blanket prescription priorauthorization protocols, are even further beyond the FDA’s purview
and difficult to realize in a culture of individualized patient care and a
legacy of deference to physician-patient decision-making. For
example, professional associations representing the clinical
community, including the AAPM and the AMA’s Opioid Task Force,
have raised concerns that “one-size-fits-all” limits, such as those CVS
Pharmacy now imposes, could impede individual patient care for
treating both opioid use disorder and chronic pain. 91 CVS’s limits
90. Califf, Woodcock & Ostroff, supra note 2, at 1480–81. The FDA has
expanded its jurisdiction to speech beyond labeling and advertising—for example,
assertion of jurisdiction over industry-sponsored CME seminars and symposia. See,
e.g., Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 62
Fed. Reg. 64,074, 64,075 (Dec. 3, 1997) (urging that providers who develop CME
programs do so “independent from the influence of the supporting company” and
“disclos[e] relationships between and among the supporting company, provider,
presenters, and products discussed that may be relevant to an assessment of the
information presented”). Since recognition of drug manufacturers’ commercial
speech in Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d. 51 (D.D.C.
1998), however, courts have protected commercial speech and widened drug
manufacturers’ latitude to publicize non-FDA approved uses of pharmaceuticals to
doctors provided they include disclaimers. See generally Matt Hellman, Commercial
Drug Claims, the FDA, and the First Amendment (Harv. U. Third Year Paper, 2001),
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/8852198/Hellman01.pdf. Accordingly,
the agency has practiced caution and self-restraint while direct-to-consumer
advertising in the U.S. has increased explosively.
91. Susan Scutti & Nadia Kounang, CVS Will Limit Opioid Prescriptions to 7
Days, CNN (Sept. 22, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/22/health/cvsprescription-restrictions-opioids-bn/index.html; cf. CVS Health, supra note 24. For
example, the AAPM’s position is, “We share concerns voiced by patient and
professional groups, and other Federal agencies, that the CDC guideline makes
disproportionately strong recommendations based upon a narrowly selected portion
of the available clinical evidence.” Press Release, Am. Acad. of Pain Med., Statement
on CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain (Mar. 16, 2016),
http://www.painmed.org/files/aapm-statement-cdc-guideline-for-prescribingopioids-for-chronic-pain.pdf; see also Califf, Woodcock & Ostroff, supra note 2, at
1480 (describing the “difficult balancing act” required for effective regulation that
does not limit providers’ options to treat patients).
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draw upon the CDC prescribing guideline, which favors opioid
prescriptions with shorter durations and at lower dosages—a guideline
the medical profession has also challenged. 92
Deference to the practice of medicine and individualized
physician-patient
decision-making
muddles
post-marketing
surveillance, as do resource limitations for post-market surveillance
and enforcement. In response to the Vioxx controversy and FDA
withdrawal of ten of its approved drugs for safety concerns between
2000 and March 2006, the Government Accountability Office and the
Institute of Medicine evaluated FDA performance and issued scathing
reports about the agency’s post-marketing surveillance performance. 93
Congress recognized and addressed the problem through
enactment of the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of
2007 (“FDAAA”). 94
This sweeping legislation, among other
measures, called for the FDA to augment premarket clinical studies,
enhance its evidentiary standard, and greatly increase post-market
communication and observational studies through Sentinel, a national

92. As of February 1, 2018, CVS will: limit opioid prescriptions for patients
new to pain therapy to seven days for severe, long-term pain treatment; limit daily
dosages based on their strength; and require use of immediate-release formulations
before ER/LA opioids. Scutti & Kounang, supra note 91.
93. See generally INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: ACTION
STEPS
FOR
CONGRESS
(2006),
https://www.nap.edu/resource/11750/futureofdrugsafety_reportbrief.pdf;
U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-402, DRUG SAFETY: IMPROVEMENT
NEEDED IN FDA’S POSTMARKET DECISION-M AKING AND OVERSIGHT PROCESSES
(2006),
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06402.pdf.
Cf.
Michael
J.
Malinowski, Government Rx—Back to the Future in Science Funding? The Next Era
in Drug Development, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 101, 113–14 (2012) [hereinafter
Malinowski, Government Rx] (discussing problems with Vioxx, Avandia, and
bisphosphonates); Malinowski, Throwing Dirt, supra note 79, at 635 (“Even with the
FDA’s portfolio of market failures . . . after several years on the market . . . and
scathing evaluations . . . of the FDA’s regulatory performance once drugs are on the
market, faith in technology endures.”); Michael J. Malinowski & Grant G.
Gautreaux, All That Is Gold Does Not Glitter in Human Clinical Research: A LawPolicy Proposal to Brighten the Global “Gold Standard” for Drug Research and
Development, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 185, 188 (2012) (“Recent market controversies
in recent years . . . have raised concerns regarding the FDA’s performance and
trustworthiness in overseeing the nation’s pharmaceutical market.”).
94. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121
Stat. 823 (2007) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399i (2012)).
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electronic system for medical product safety surveillance. 95 While
arguably profound conceptually and theoretically, “FDAAA
breathe[d] new life into classic infrastructure regulatory problems by
requiring evidence that can only be generated with a massive,
networked informational infrastructure that does not yet exist and will
have to be financed, built, and administered.”96
HHS directed the FDA to create Sentinel and launched the
initiative in May 2008, the effort advanced beyond “Mini-Sentinel
pilot” stage in 2016, and Sentinel is evolving with practicality
realizations and adjustments.97 Beyond finance constraints, a primary
obstacle to Sentinel coming into fruition in the foreseeable future, as
envisioned, is reliance on and aversions to timely and thorough selfreporting—especially given the intended transparency. In addition to
industry proprietary and corporate interests prevalent in our freemarket health care system, Sentinel presupposes changing physician
culture. “Doctors . . . have an aversion to reporting. For instance,
while the Food and Drug Administration relies on physicians to help
monitor product safety by alerting the agency to adverse patient
reactions, doctors usually do not make such filings, saying they are too
busy for the paperwork.”98 Moreover, the uncertainty innate in the art
of individualized medicine invites reporting apprehension and
hesitation—“physician think,” such as, “Perhaps the cause was just my
particular patient’s drug interactions, lifestyle choices, medical history,
or failure to follow orders . . . or perhaps my failure to know as much
as I should about this particular drug.” Concerns about professional
ramifications of not knowing do as well. 99
95. See generally CDER Conversation: The FDA’s Sentinel Initiative, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/NewsEvents/ucm586259.htm
(last updated Nov. 27, 2017); see also Barbara J. Evans, Authority of the Food and
Drug Administration to Require Data Access and Control Use Rights in the Sentinel
Data Network, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 67 (2010); Evans, supra note 68, at 425
(describing FDAAA’s “paradigm-shifting amendments” that “accept[] that clinical
have intrinsic limitations” resulting in a “pragmatic reassessment of their evidentiary
value”).
96. Evans, supra note 68, at 421–22.
97. See generally CDER Conversation, supra note 95.
98. Barry Meier, Doctors Who Don’t Speak Out, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2013,
at SR5.
99. See, e.g., 60 Minutes: Prescription for Trouble (CBS television broadcast
Nov. 14, 2004) (interviewing clinical researchers who published negative data about

2018

The U.S. Science and Technology “Triple Threat”

1053

2. Opioid Production Beyond Responsible Pain Management
Physicians’ broad discretion to prescribe opioids the FDA
deems safe and efficacious, and which manufacturers produce and
market under FDA oversight, reliance on industry and medical
community data, and the sheer volume of data that the DEA must
process for decision-making complicate the DEA’s exercise of its
authority to limit production. 100 When exercising its APQ and DCD
authority and responsibilities, the DEA risks placing itself in a
precarious position. The agency is subject to accusations from a
chorus of the loud, politically influential voices of the medical
profession, industry, and patient advocates bellowing that it is
impeding the supply of opioids necessary for medically legitimate pain
management. 101
The DEA allegedly caved under such pressures when, in
September 2015, it settled the largest opioid-distribution case in U.S.
history against the McKesson Corporation. With some 73,000

Vioxx in peer-reviewed literature and were subjected to professional attacks from
Merck, the drug’s manufacturer).
100. The data the DEA must process to set APQs is voluminous and in a
constant state of flux:
In setting the APQ, DEA considers data from many sources,
including estimates of the legitimate medical need; estimates of
retail consumption based on prescriptions dispensed;
manufacturers’ data on actual production, sales, inventory, exports,
product development needs, and manufacturing losses; data from
DEA’s own internal system for tracking controlled substance
transactions; and past quota histories.
Once the aggregate quota is set, DEA allocates individual
manufacturing and procurement quotas to those companies that
apply for it. DEA may revise a company’s quota at any time during
the year if change is warranted due to increased sales or exports;
new manufacturers entering the market; new product development;
or product recalls.
Press Release, U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., DEA Proposes Reduction to Amount of
Controlled Substances to be Manufactured in 2018 (Aug. 4, 2017),
https://www.dea.gov/press-releases/2017/08/04/dea-proposes-reduction-amountcontrolled-substances-be-manufactured-2018.
101. Cf. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016,
Pub. L. 114-145, 130 Stat. 354 (2016) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 823–24 (2012 & Supp.
2017)); see also infra note 110 and accompanying text.
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employees, thirty drug warehouses across the nation, and revenue of
almost $200 billion annually, McKesson is America’s fifth-largest
public corporation and its top drug distributor. 102 At the time of the
investigation, McKesson was a second-time offender: the company
had paid a $13.25 million fine in 2008 for “failing to report hundreds
of suspicious hydrocodone orders from Internet pharmacies—even
after being warned by the DEA three years earlier that is was shipping
excessive amounts of Vicodin.”103 As part of this previous settlement,
McKesson also pledged to temporarily suspend distribution of
narcotics from two of its centers and to enhance its system to
responsibly monitor and report suspicious drug orders.104 According
to the DEA, however, McKesson reverted to its previous behavior
within two years and filled unusually large, frequent orders placed by
pharmacies, some of which knowingly supplied drug rings. 105
McKesson allegedly “raised its own self-imposed limits, known as
thresholds, on orders from pharmacies and continued to ship increasing
amounts of drugs in the face of numerous red flags.” 106
After 2 years of aggressive investigation, David Schiller, head
of the DEA team that investigated McKesson and an agent with some
three decades of experience, and colleagues believed that the case was
strong enough to support revocation of registrations to distribute
controlled substances at multiple McKesson drug warehouses, a fine
of $1 billion or more, and criminal prosecution. 107 Rather, according
to the terms of the settlement, McKesson promised to be more diligent
about diversion of its pills to street use, and agreed to temporarily
suspend controlled substance shipments to four of its distribution
centers and pay a $150 million fine. 108 The latter was “only about $50
million more than the compensation [in 2016] for McKesson board
chairman and chief executive John H. Hammergren, the nation’s thirdhighest-paid chief executive.”109
102. Bernstein & Higham, supra note 24; 60 Minutes: Biggest Opioid Case,
supra note 24.
103. Bernstein & Higham, supra note 24.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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These political pressures and influences also resulted in the
Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016
(“Access Act”) quietly becoming law on April 19, 2016—in the midst
of a frenzy of national media attention on the opioid crisis as the
deadliest drug epidemic in U.S. history. 110 The legislation, which
greatly diminished the DEA’s ability to freeze suspicious shipments
from drug companies under the pretext of making opioids available to
patients, did not itself draw attention until October 2017, when 60
Minutes and the Washington Post reported the findings of their joint
investigation of the Access Act.111 U.S. Representative Tom Marino,
whom President Trump had nominated to head the ONDCP (to serve
as the nation’s “drug czar”), who had invested years pushing the
Access Act through Congress, and who wrote the version of the
legislation that ultimately became law, withdrew his nomination two
days later.112

110. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016,
Pub. L. No. 114-145, 130 Stat. 354 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 823–824 (2012 & Supp.
2017)). See generally Peter Baker, Tom Marino, Drug Czar Nominee, Withdraws in
Latest Setback for Trump’s Opioid Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/us/politics/trump-says-drug-czar-nomineetom-marino-withdraws-from-consideration.html; Anne Gearan et al., Trump Says
Drug Czar Nominee Tom Marino is Withdrawing After Washington Post/“60
Minutes”
Investigation,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
17,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/10/17/trump-saysdrug-czar-nominee-tom-marino-is-withdrawing-after-washington-post60-minutesinvestigation/; Amber Phillips, A Cheat Sheet to the Investigation That Cost Rep. Tom
Marino the Nomination to Be Drug Czar, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/10/17/a-cheat-sheet-to-theinvestigation-that-cost-tom-marino-the-job-as-drug-czar/.
Both the House and
Senate have introduced legislation to repeal the Marino-crafted legislation, but efforts
continue to linger. See generally A Bill to Repeal the Amendments Made to the
Controlled Substances Act by the Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug
Enforcement
Act
of
2016,
S.
1960,
115th
Cong.
(2017),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1960; To Repeal the
Amendments Made to the Controlled Substances Act by the Ensuring
Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016, H.R. 4084, 115th
Cong. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/4084.
111. See generally Baker, supra note 110; Gearan et al., supra note 110;
Phillips, supra note 110.
112. Phillips, supra note 110.
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The federal government’s failure to meet its responsibilities to
control the nation’s supply and distribution of prescription opioids has
forced the states to attempt to do so. While Congress has been
investigating “how drug distributors . . . sent 780 million pills over six
years in West Virginia—433 doses for every man, woman, and child
in the state,” and more than 20.8 million pills over ten years in a coal
mining town with just 3,191 residents and two pharmacies (6,500
prescription painkillers per person), states have been taking action.113
As of December 2017, forty-one state attorneys general had joined
forces to sue the opioid industry. 114
Moreover, although the DEA has set APQs to cut prescription
opioid production significantly in 2018, 115 the effort is arguably futile
given the impact of a similar measure in 2017116 and the millions of
people already addicted.
As former Commissioner Kessler
commented, “when the agency cracks down on one form of the drug,
opioid addicts move to other forms to sustain their addiction. Playing
Whac-a-Mole is hardly a strategy.”117
IV. A NATIONAL PRESCRIPTION OPIOID TREATMENT PLAN
The U.S., in a state of political division, is grappling with debate
over myriad issues, including the ACA, Medicaid funding, and health
care in general.118 Nevertheless, there is resounding consensus that the
nation’s opioid crisis is an epidemic and building, it must be contained,
113. Bernstein & Higham, supra note 24; Gabe Gutierrez et al., This Tiny West
Virginia Town is Awash in Prescription Painkillers, NBC NEWS (Feb. 2, 2018),
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/this-tiny-west-virginia-town-is-awash-inprescription-painkillers/ar-BBIAlK3?li=AA4ZnC.
114. Bernstein and Higham, supra note 24.
115. See Alicia Ault, DEA Proposes Significant Cuts to Opioid Production in
2018, MEDSCAPE (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/884055.
116. U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., supra note 52.
117. Kessler, supra note 3.
118. See David Ignatius, One Nation, Divided Under Trump, with Perilous
Consequences,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
28,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-divisiveness-puts-america-atrisk/2017/12/28/6cd5b738-ec11-11e7-9f92-10a2203f6c8d_story.html; Chuck Todd,
Mark Murray & Carrie Dann, A Nation Divided Under Trump, NBC NEWS (Nov. 21,
2017),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/nation-divided-under-trumpn822811.
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and that time is of the essence. 119 As President Trump, the National
Commission, and a plethora of government agencies have recognized,
the scale of this public health emergency, in terms of its ongoing and
escalating impact on human health and treatment complexities, poses
a government challenge on par with some of the greatest this nation
has ever confronted.120
Acknowledging the pervasiveness and dire consequences of the
opioid crisis, which observers have empirically documented beyond
question, without funding an intervention on scale with the problem is
arguably the cruelest form of government hypocrisy. While Congress
authorized over $181 million each year to fight the opioid epidemic
under the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, it
scattered the funding and subjected it to annual renewals.121 Similarly,
Congress’s “responsiveness” to the problem through the 21st Century
Cures Act opioid provisions, enacted during the Obama
Administration’s final hours—the administration’s “curtain call”
legislation—will, at most, make only some contributions. The Cures
Act bundles the opioid crisis with curing cancer and a blitzkrieg of
other expansive health care missions, accompanied by relaxation of
biopharmaceutical regulations, without enough secured funding over
time to realistically accomplish them meaningfully under the Trump
Administration.122 The pattern lingers: the appropriation of an

119. See generally supra Part III.
120. See, e.g., supra note 31 and accompanying text; COMM’N FINAL REPORT,
supra note 10; COMM’N INTERIM REPORT, supra note 10.
121. See generally Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, Pub.
L. 114-198, 130 Stat. 695 (2016).
122. See generally 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. 114-255, 103 Stat. 1033
(2016).
The Act contains provisions that Roll back regulations of the
biopharmaceutical industry, and much of its funding is subject to annual
appropriations:
The catch was that while the regulatory rollback that so
rankled some Democrats is guaranteed, the research funding is not.
It will have to be appropriated each year. Even worse in
Democrats’ eyes, it will be paid for in part by raiding more than $3
billion from Obamacare’s Prevention and Public Health Fund,
which pays for anti-smoking campaigns and other preventive
health efforts.
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additional $6 billion over two years under the Budget Act of 2018 is a
vague and insufficient response to an increasingly defined and deadly
opioid epidemic. 123
Those trained in law and policy are versed in the significance
of precedent, and the importance of drawing from history and
experience—to avoid past mistakes and to garner insights to meet
present challenges—is a notion broadly instilled and shared. The U.S.
experience, dating from the middle of the last century and robust in the
present one, is that government, industry, and academia, when melded
into a focused force—a triple threat—introduces the potential to jolt
science application forward from its status quo to overcome ominous
public health and other societal challenges, with benefits well beyond.
The following discussion first summarizes this experience, and then
draws upon it to propose a law and policy treatment plan capable of
meeting the nation’s pressing opioid crisis challenge.
A. The U.S. Science and Technology Triple Threat Legacy
The U.S. has faced and overcome extraordinary challenges,
including saving democratic society from annihilation during WWII,
by intervening aggressively to advance science and technology. The
U.S. entered WWII without much of a standing army and with
enormous fear that the Nazis could and would develop an atomic
bomb.124 The U.S. built the former and quelled the latter through

Biden and other supporters told concerned Democrats that the
Obamacare money would disappear anyway with the repeal of the
health law.
Sarah Karlin-Smith et al., Biden’s Farewell Gift: Cancer Moonshot Helps Pass $6.3
Billion
Research
Bill,
POLITICO
(Dec.
7,
2016,
5:22
PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/joe-biden-cancer-moonshot-bill-232342.
123. See generally Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-123, 132 Stat.
164 (2018); see also Paige Winfield Cunningham, The Health 202: Congress Is
Poised to Invest More Dollars in the Opioid Crisis, WASH. POST: POWERPOST (Feb.
8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-health202/2018/02/08/the-health-202-congress-is-poised-to-invest-more-dollars-in-theopioid-crisis/5a7b434830fb041c3c7d769b/; Yglesias, supra note 39, and
accompanying text.
124. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/MA-0001-01/99, THE MANHATTAN
PROJECT:
MAKING
THE
ATOMIC
BOMB
vii
(1999),
http://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/media/Making_Atomic_Bomb.pdf.
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determined intervention that harnessed and orchestrated the resources
of government, academia, and industry—a triple threat strategy—to
accomplish both, and it became a legacy of utilizing this triple threat
methodology to jolt science and technology forward to overcome
defined and daunting challenges. 125
The Manhattan Project (“MP”) was a massive, hands-on,
federal government undertaking with a defined research and
development mission and under daunting time pressure. 126 The U.S.
accomplished its mission by orchestrating the establishment of
laboratories across the nation, an army of researchers, and direct
industry involvement—most notably Dupont—under defined, focused
government direction. 127 The U.S. emerged from WWII with
established, expansive, and ongoing relationships with industry and
academia, while industry and academia largely shifted back to their
separate science-technology tracks and cultures.128
Beyond
undertaking expansive direct government research, the U.S. continued
to invest substantially in both academic and industry science and
technology during the Cold War era—industry research through the
military-industrial complex and academic research through federal
grant funding allocated by peer review. 129 This investment fueled the
nation’s global economic and academic competitiveness, military

125. See generally Malinowski, Government Rx, supra note 93.
126. See
generally
The
Manhattan
Project,
U.S.
HISTORY,
http://www.ushistory.org/us/51f.asp (last visited Sept. 2, 2018); see also generally
THE MANHATTAN PROJECT: THE BIRTH OF THE ATOMIC BOMB IN THE WORDS OF ITS
CREATORS, EYEWITNESSES, AND HISTORIANS 294–313 (Cynthia C. Kelly ed., 2007)
[hereinafter THE BIRTH OF THE ATOMIC BOMB]; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note
124.
127. RICHARD RHODES, THE MAKING OF THE ATOMIC BOMB 431 (1986); U.S.
DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 124, at 28–29. While industry culture in research
already was anchored in application, “[g]iven the absolute priority of the war effort,
the usual academic tasks of universities were largely displaced for the duration.”
ROGER L. GEIGER, RESEARCH & RELEVANT KNOWLEDGE 7 (2d ed. 2004). The
precedent of federal research grant funding, including “administrative overhead,” was
established: “The basic relationship between the federal government and universities
for conducting wartime research was governed by contracts negotiated according to
the principle of no-loss and no-gain. Universities were reimbursed for the direct costs
they incurred and also given some allowance for overhead.” Id. at 6.
128. See generally GEIGER, supra note 127.
129. Malinowski, Government Rx, supra note 93, at 106–07.
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strength, and space program for decades. 130 President Eisenhower
thoughtfully reflected upon this rite of passage for the U.S.
government, its implications, and the future of science and technology
in his January 17, 1961, farewell address:
[R]esearch has become central; it also becomes more
formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing
share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the
Federal government. . . . The prospect of domination of
the nation’s scholars by Federal employment, project
allocations, and the power of money is ever present —
and is gravely to be regarded.
Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in
respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal
and opposite danger that public policy could itself
become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.
It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance,
and to integrate these and other forces, new and old,
within the principles of our democratic system—ever
aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society. 131
After decades of building prosperity, and in spite of enormous
ongoing investment in science and technology, economic crisis
overwhelmed the U.S. by the end of the 1970s. 132 The Vietnam War,
Watergate scandal, and resignation of President Nixon shook faith in
the U.S. government domestically and abroad. 133 Economically, the
country faced double-digit unemployment, a severe oil shortage
necessitated harsh rationing and caused prices at the pump to
skyrocket, and foreign competitors, which had taken the lead in the
automobile and other sectors once the U.S.’s domain globally, posed a

130. Id. at 108–09.
131. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Radio and Television Address
to the American People (Jan. 17,
1961),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=12086&st=farewell&st1=.
132. See generally DOMINIC SANDBROOK, MAD AS HELL: THE CRISIS OF THE
1970S AND THE RISE OF THE POPULIST RIGHT (2012).
133. Id.
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competitive threat overall. 134 The failures of both big government and
big business exasperated the public. 135 Demands for more research
and development and economic stimulus grew deafening and shouted
Congress into action. 136
Congress responded in the spirit of the MP by undertaking a
grand science research-and-development triple-threat experiment: the
introduction of U.S. federal technology transfer law and policy, which
Congress jumpstarted through legislation in 1980. 137 The core strategy
was to free science and technology innovation financed with federal
funding, which was lingering in a state of research institution
purgatory,138 by giving it away on the condition that it be applied
commercially—thereby stimulating the economy on national, state,
and local levels. 139 Although the initiative originally targeted only
134.

See generally MEG JACOBS, PANIC AT THE PUMP: THE ENERGY CRISIS AND
POLITICS IN THE 1970S (2017). See also ALAN
S. BLINDER, INFLATION: CAUSES AND EFFECTS 270–71 (1982); MICHAEL S. SHERRY,
IN THE SHADOW OF WAR: THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE 1930S 329–31 (1995).
135. See generally SANDBROOK, supra note 132; JACOBS, supra note 134.
136. Malinowski, Government Rx, supra note 93, at 106–07.
137. The primary pieces of legislation, both enacted in 1980, are the Bayh-Dole
University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517,
94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2012)) [hereinafter
Bayh-Dole], and the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3724 (2012))
[hereinafter Stevenson-Wydler]. Later, Congress added to these Acts to expand R&D
opportunities. For a full discussion of U.S. technology transfer law and policy, see
generally MALINOWSKI, supra note 49, at 69–77.
138. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:
ADMINISTRATION OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT BY RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES 2–3 (1998)
[hereinafter GAO, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER] (“At the time, fewer than 5 percent of
the 28,000 patents being held by federal agencies had been licensed, compared with
25 percent to 30 percent of the small number of federal patents for which the
government had allowed companies to retain title to the invention.”); Chester G.
Moore, Killing the Bayh-Dole Act’s Golden Goose, 8 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
151, 153–54 (2006); James Stuart, The Academic-Industrial Complex: A Warning to
Universities, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1033–34 (2004) (“Whereas the major
principle in the decades after World War II was that technology owned by the
government was for ‘everyone’s benefit,’ supporters of the [Bayh-Dole] Act claimed
that this policy effectively rendered government-owned technology for ‘nobody’s
benefit.’ It simply gathered dust in government repositories.”).
139. “The legislative intent of Bayh-Dole” and Stevenson-Wydler “was,
through reform of patent policy related to government-sponsored research: (1) to
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
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small businesses, the U.S. expanded it during the 1980s to include all
commercial ventures and to bestow complementary research and
development opportunities to government agencies and researchers. 140
This grand, triple-threat experiment enabled the formation of an
entire vibrant biotechnology sector in less time than it takes to develop
a single innovative new prescription drug, and it launched a global
genomics revolution with the U.S. dually positioned as its detonator
and epicenter.141 On the footing of this accomplishment, the U.S. then
utilized its triple-threat strategy to undertake the Human Genome
Project (“HGP”)—an initiative that fully embraced the core
methodology used to accomplish its MP predecessor. Like the MP,
the HGP had a defined mission that necessitated intense, triple-threat
collaborations and crisp, focused government leadership to accomplish
decisive, tangible objectives.142 Essential for credibility, Congress
securely funded the HGP over a block of time—$3 billion (FY1991
dollars) for up to fifteen years. 143 Moreover, the U.S. placed the HGP

enable and encourage universities, not-for-profit corporations, and small businesses
to patent and commercialize their federally-funded inventions and (2) to allow federal
agencies to grant exclusive licenses for their technology to provide more incentive to
businesses.”
Malinowski, Government Rx, supra note 93, at 108; GAO,
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 138, at 3. As the NIH explained, the collective
goal of these Acts “is to promote economic development, enhance U.S.
competitiveness, and benefit the public by encouraging the commercialization of
technologies that would otherwise not be developed into products due to lack of
incentives.” U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT’L INSTS. ON HEALTH,
NIH RESPONSE TO THE CONFERENCE REPORT REQUEST FOR A PLAN TO ENSURE
TAXPAYERS’
INTERESTS
ARE
PROTECTED
4
(2001),
https://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/wydenrpt.pdf.
140. MALINOWSKI, supra note 49, at 69–77.
141. Id. at xxiii–xxx.
142. HGP centered on achieving three technical goals: to produce (1) physical
maps of large chromosome regions to enable direct study of DNA structure in search
of genes, (2) genetic linkage maps to study chromosome regions, and (3) substantial
DNA sequence information to enable correlation of DNA changes with alterations in
biological function. Id. at 13; Michael J. Malinowski & Maureen A. O’Rourke, A
False Start? The Impact of Federal Policy on the Genotechnology Industry, 13 YALE
J. REG. 163, 190 (1996).
143. Nat’l Institutes on Health, Human Genome Project Completion:
Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST.,
https://www.genome.gov/11006943/human-genome-project-completion-frequentlyasked-questions/ (last updated Oct. 30, 2010). A noted distinction is that President
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on a bedrock of federal technology transfer law and policy and
government-academia-industry collaboration, which served as an
expansive battleground for a genomics revolution. 144 The HGP was a
global phenomenon, for it transcended borders as well as disciplines
from its inception:
[T]he immediate impact of HGP was to instill a profound
focus in the international science community not
experienced since the Manhattan Project. The science
community and research institutions were heavily
influenced by a guaranteed flow of considerable U.S.
federal grant funding for more than a decade. An
additional draw was the direct commitment of two major
U.S. federal agencies (NIH and the Department of
Energy, DOE), and the same from global counterparts
through the Wellcome Trust and other countries’
complementary programs.
Another was an
unprecedented international network focused on human
genetics during an era of intense internet communication
that has and continues to rise in volume exponentially.145
The HGP was an enormous undertaking—a proverbial “white
elephant”—when launched in 1990 and years into the project, for very
little of the essential enabling technology, especially the
bioinformatics capabilities so crucial to its success, existed at the
time. 146 In 1997, approximately the half-way point in HGP’s originally
anticipated fifteen-year duration, ninety percent of the project’s budget
Franklin D. Roosevelt moved forward with the MP in 1941 under a thickly piled
shroud of secrecy—maintained remarkably well until completed four years later and
in spite of some 100,000 people working on it. Nat’l Constitution Ctr., On This Day,
FDR Approves Funding the Manhattan Project, CONST. DAILY (Oct. 9, 2017),
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/on-this-day-fdr-approves-funding-the-manhattanproject. For secrecy, and to ensure necessary funding shielded from Congressional
intrusion, the executive branch financed the project through discretionary funds. Id.
“In all, the United States spent an estimated $2 billion on a project that employed
more than 120,000 people to build a nuclear weapon.” Id.
144. MALINOWSKI, supra note 49, at 1–14.
145. Id. at 13 (citation omitted).
146. Michael J. Malinowski, Separating Predictive Genetic Testing from Snake
Oil: Regulation, Liabilities, and Lost Opportunities, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 23, 23–26
(2000).
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had been spent to accurately sequence just 2.68% of the human
genome. 147 Yet through government and industry competition and
collaboration, researchers completed the HGP ahead of schedule and
under budget—somewhat of a phenomenon in “government work.” 148
The accomplishment was simply remarkable, as President Clinton
observed when he announced completion of a preliminary draft:
We are here to celebrate the completion of the first
survey of the entire human genome. Without a doubt,
this is the most important, most wondrous map ever
produced by humankind. . . . More than 1,000
researchers across six nations have revealed nearly all 3
billion letters of our miraculous genetic code. I
congratulate all of you on this stunning and humbling
achievement.
Today’s announcement represents more than just an
epic-making triumph of science and reason. After all,
when Galileo discovered he could use the tools of
mathematics and mechanics to understand the motion of

147. See Juan Enriquez & Ray Goldberg, Transforming Life, Transforming
Business: The Life-Science Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2000 at 95
(noting that advances in genetic research are setting off an industrial convergence),
https://hbr.org/2000/03/transforming-life-transforming-business-the-life-sciencerevolution.
148. As the Human Genome Research Institute summarized
In 1990, Congress established funding for the Human Genome
Project and set a target completion date of 2005. Although
estimates suggested that the project would cost a total of $3 billion
over this period, the project ended up costing less than expected,
about $2.7 billion in FY 1991 dollars. Additionally, the project is
being completed more than two years ahead of schedule.
Nat’l Institutes on Health, supra note 143. See generally MICHAEL A. FORTUN,
CELERA GENOMICS : THE RACE FOR THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE HUMAN GENOME (2006); Press Release, Nat’l Human Genome Research
Institute, International Consortium Completes Human Genome Project (Apr. 14,
2003), http://www.genome.gov/11006929; see also generally 409 NATURE 745
(2001) (issue dedicated to the release of a draft map of the human genome); 291
SCIENCE 1145 (2001) (issue entitled “The Human Genome”). Pushed to the finish
line by Celera Genomics, a commercial competitor formed in 1998 to pick up with
the work accomplished by the government effort at that point, all in the public domain,
and challenge it in a race to complete the genome sequencing.
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celestial bodies, he felt, in the words of one eminent
researcher, “that he had learned the language in which
God created the universe.”
Today, we are learning the language in which God
created life. . . . Genome science will have a real impact
on all our lives—and even more, on the lives of our
children. It will revolutionize the diagnosis, prevention
and treatment of most, if not all, human diseases.149
The combined impact of the technology transfer and HGP
triple-threat initiatives has been profound—for the advancement of
technology research and development, economically, and increasingly
for the improvement of human health. Pharmaceuticals are the past,
while biopharmaceuticals are the very real present and future. 150
Advancement of genomic science is translating into clinical human
health benefits, such as a proliferation of quality, clinically meaningful
genetic screening to enhance preventive care, to improve diagnoses,
and to make much more informed and better choices among treatment
options.151 Today’s patients live in an era of biopharmaceuticals and
biologics that intervene in disease pathways rather than just take away
symptoms, and treatments such as immunotherapies. 152 The advent of
genomics in clinical care has just begun, and the potential to improve
human health appears limited only by imagination, determination,
time, and health care resources, though the latter is increasingly
daunting.153

149. Press Release, The White House, Remarks Made by the President, Prime
Minister Tony Blair of England (via satellite), Dr. Francis Collins, Director of the
National Human Genome Research Institute, and Dr. Craig Venter, President and
Chief Scientific Officer, Celera Genomics Corporation, on the Completion of the First
Survey of the Entire Human Genome Project (June 26, 2000), http://www.genome.
gov/10001356.
150. MALINOWSKI, supra note 49, at xxi–xxix.
151. KAREN JEGALIAN, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., NIH PUB. NO.
00-4873,
GENETICS :
THE
FUTURE
OF
MEDICINE
(2005),
https://www.genome.gov/pages/educationkit/images/nhgri.pdf.
152. MALINOWSKI, supra note 49, at xxiii–xxix.
153. See id. at xxi–xxii (noting that the “future for genomic medicine is
bright”). Juxtaposing the U.S.’s wrangling over the ACA and health care costs with
the cost of innovative biologics that are the means to treat life-threatening and
otherwise seriously life-debilitating diseases for which no sufficient treatments exist
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B. An Opioid Addiction and Pain Pathway Project Proposal
In the midst of pervasive divisiveness within the U.S., there is
profound consensus that the nation’s opioid epidemic demands bold
government intervention on a critical basis. 154 The opioid epidemic
has been escalating and raging for years, it is out of control and has
been so for years, and time is of the essence. 155 As former FDA
Commissioner Kessler observed in this context, times of crisis are
opportunities for change—for example, the precarious state of U.S.
health care finance drove passage of the ACA, despite its muddle of
ambiguities, uncertainties, and the hawkish opposition it triggered. 156
The health care finance situation is even more dire now, however, as
costs have continued to climb, and existing funding for federal and
state programs is in jeopardy. 157
The dire state and scope of the opioid epidemic and the nation’s
public health demands a federal government response that, consistent
with the HGP,158 transcends any presidential administration,
especially the present one. 159 The national public health emergency
is beyond sobering. At annual costs that may exceed $45,000 for a course of
treatment, biologics threaten to further overwhelm health care systems. See Lacie
Glover, Why Are Biologic Drugs So Costly? A Look at How Biologics are Made, How
Much they Cost and Why, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 6, 2015, 12:40 PM), http://
health.usnews.com/health-news/health-wellness/articles/2015/02/06/why-arebiologic-drugs-so-costly. “According to pharmacy benefits giant Express Scripts,
even though only 2 percent of the population uses biologic drugs, biologics account
for 40 percent of prescription drug spending in the U.S.” Id.
154. Cf. supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing the disappointing
results of the Government’s case against McKesson). See also Kessler, supra note 3
(“Most people agree that the federal government should tackle public health crises,
and there is a particular consensus about the current epidemic involving opioids.”).
155. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
156. See generally Robert M. Sade, The Health Care Reform Law (PPACA):
Controversies in Ethics and Policy, 40(3) J.L. MED. & ETHICS 523, 523–24 (2012).
157. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 142–153 and accompanying text.
159. The Roosevelt Administration accomplished the MP through enormous
executive branch discretionary funding to ensure tight orchestration, adequate
resources, and secrecy—a cloak to protect the project from Congressional intrusion
during a world war, and during a very different (pre-Pentagon Papers and Watergate
scandal) time in the history of the American presidency. See generally The
Manhattan Project, supra note 126; THE BIRTH OF THE ATOMIC BOMB, supra note
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that the opioid epidemic poses beckons a Congressional response, and
federal and state public health policing and parens patriae powers
provide the authority to do so. 160 Congress must sufficiently and
securely fund a national, multifaceted legislative response with defined
direction and leadership that builds upon ongoing initiatives and draws
from the U.S.’s science and technology triple-threat legacy of
overcoming similarly ominous challenges through advancement of
science and technology. Through a legislative mandate to which
agency and HHS heads are held administratively accountable,
Congress must designate centralized leadership, similar to the
leadership that NIH Director Francis Collins provided as head of the
HGP.161 The administrative head or heads designated should “have
explicit, unambiguous authority over [opioid epidemic recovery and
containment] programs, now in the hands of many others, and see to it
that we effectively treat those who are addicted and prevent the next
generation from becoming addicted.” 162
NIH and her sister agencies shifting funding from their annual
budgets to prioritize opioid strategies and to advance pain pathway
science and technology also is commendable and necessary. However,
it is not enough. An undeniable reality is that meeting the challenge
posed by the ongoing opioid crisis in the timeframe this national public
health emergency demands will cost the nation tens of billions of
dollars beyond existing federal agency operating budgets and ongoing
health care funding.
Other realities, however, are that the

126. The nation’s response to the opioid crisis must take the form of a legislative
mandate superimposed over the idiosyncrasies and subjectivities of a sitting president.
160. See generally James Hodge, Jr., Implementing Modern Public Health
Goals Through Government: An Examination of New Federalism and Public Health
Law, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 93 (1997). Federal police powers are based
in the Commerce Clause, and States’ police powers are grounded in the Constitution’s
reservation of power and rights to them under the Tenth Amendment. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Constitutional checks on these
powers, requiring government interventions to be sufficiently compelling, are due
process under, respectively the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and individual
rights under the First Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amends. I, V, XIV. See also
SANDRA H. JOHNSON ET AL., BIOETHICS AND LAW IN A NUTSHELL, 273–277, 280–285
(2d ed. 2016). Cf. infra notes 177–179 and accompanying text (comparing aspects of
this Article’s proposal to other congressional interventions into health care).
161. Cf. generally VICTOR K. MCELHENY, DRAWING THE MAP OF LIFE (2010).
162. Kessler, supra note 3.
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consequences of opioid addiction already have cost the nation much
more financially, they are continuing to do so, and that cost is rising as
the epidemic is amassing. 163 Immensely more significant than the
financial costs, the opioid addiction epidemic has and continues to
consume lives that the federal and state governments have a public
health duty to protect—as the U.S. directly acknowledged when it
officially declared the opioid epidemic a public health emergency. 164
The following discussion proposes such a treatment plan—an
Addiction and Pain Pathway Project (“APPP”). The APPP primary
objectives would be: (1) to advance pain-pathway science and
technology research and development consistent with the triple-threat
methodology of the MP and the HGP; and (2) to contain the supply
side of the prescription opioid problem. The methodology proposed
for the latter involves introducing meaningful controls on prescribing,
production, and distribution practices realized by a combination of
legislative mandates and federal funding targeted to meet them.
1. Proposed Pain Pathway Science and Technology R&D Objective
The nation anxiously awaits an infusion of deeper
understanding and innovative treatment alternatives for addiction and
pain management. The APPP could jolt addiction and pain-pathway
science and technology forward consistent with the advances in atomic
and nuclear science realized through the MP and in genomics realized
through the HGP.165 NIH, well-versed in triple-threat science and

163.
164.

Id.
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., DETERMINATION THAT A
PUBLIC
HEALTH
EMERGENCY
EXISTS
(Oct.
26,
2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opioid%20PHE%20Declaration-no-sig.pdf
(official declaration of Acting Secretary Eric D. Hargan that the opioid crisis
constitutes a public health emergency); accord Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health
and Human Servs., HHS Acting Secretary Declares Public Health Emergency to
Address
National
Opioid
Crisis
(Oct.
26,
2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2017/10/26/hhs-acting-secretary-declares-publichealth-emergency-address-national-opioid-crisis.html.
165. Peaceful Nuclear Innovations, ATOMIC HERITAGE FOUND. (June 5, 2014),
https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/peaceful-nuclear-innovations; see also
generally 291 SCIENCE 1145 (2001) (issue entitled “The Human Genome”); 409
NATURE 745 (2001) (issue dedicated to the release of a draft map of the human
genome).
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technology research-and-development methodology through HGP and
decades of federal technology transfer experience, is pursuing industry
collaboration through its Opioid Initiative. 166 According to the FDA,
“[t]he pharmaceutical industry has shown significant interest in
developing abuse-deterrent opioid formulations and the field is
progressing rapidly.”167
Congress should enact legislation to launch APPP with a
research-and-development component modeled after the HGP that
aggressively utilizes technology transfer law and policy—meaning full
integration of government, academic, and industry resources. 168
Moreover, given ongoing progress in the field and pervasive,
immediate patient need, Congress should frontload the outcomes
timeline and budget accordingly. The commitment and stability of
substantial research-and-development funding over time to achieve
targeted goals through collaboration among government, academia,
and industry positioned both MP and HGP for success; that success
was extraordinary, and it jolted the relevant science and technology
forward to overcome ominous challenges. 169 Both initiatives created
focused, collaborative science research-and-development epicenters
for government, academia, and industry.
Such a research-and-development component would require
generous and sound funding, additional incentives, and assurances to
prove persuasive enough to draw the critical mass of industry
involvement necessary to advance pain pathway research and
development on a level commensurate with ongoing public health
need. Biopharmaceutical research and development in particular is
extraordinarily risk-intensive and accompanied by a lengthy

166. NIH’s initiative includes “working with FDA and private sector experts to
draft a plan for a formal partnership to advance specific pharmacological treatments
for pain and addiction.” U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., NIH Opioid Initiative
to Help End the Opioid Crisis, NAT’L INSTITUTES ON HEALTH,
https://www.nih.gov/node/34206 (last visited Jan. 9, 2018). In 2017, NIH convened
a series of meetings with experts from across government, industry, and academia to
determine the pharmacological areas that could be best addressed through a publicprivate partnership. Id.
167. Califf, Woodock & Ostroff, supra note 2, at 1483.
168. See supra notes 142–144.
169. See generally supra Section IV.A.
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timeline. 170 Industry has become accustomed to acquiring federallyfunded basic, and even some advanced, research-innovation outcomes
through decades of experience with federal technology transfer law
and policy. 171 Industry decisions to make research-and-development
commitments are zero-sum in that they inevitably entail opportunity
costs, and technology transfer generates an ongoing plethora of
opportunity alternatives.
Moreover, multinational biopharmaceutical companies, many
with tens of thousands of employees, are, at times, as bureaucratic as
small countries.172 Top executives are cognizant of their potentially
brief “shelf lives” in those positions. 173 Containing taxes and
profitability for investors are priorities and fiduciary
responsibilities.174 Opioid manufacturing, in part because of their

170. See Malinowski, Government Rx, supra note 93, at 109–110.
171. See MALINOWSKI, supra note 49, at 69–77.
172. Consider how the multinational pharmaceutical sector adhered to its
traditional, largely chemistry-based research and development until, in the late 1990s,
it realized that its portfolio of drug products was falling off patent protection and its
pipeline for new products was running dry. See Michael J. Malinowski, Law, Policy,
and Market Implications of Genetic Profiling in Drug Development, 2 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 31, 34–35 (2002). Fortunately for the pharmaceutical industry,
it was able to buy up biotech from that maturing sector, resulting in today’s combined
biopharmaceuticals focus in drug development. Id. Centralization of review of all
new drugs, whether based primarily in biology or chemistry, within the Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research (“CDER”) beginning in 2004, confirmed that
pharmaceutical R&D and biotech had integrated extensively. Michael J. Malinowski
& Grant G. Gautreaux, Drug Development-Stuck in A State of Puberty?: Regulatory
Reform of Human Clinical Research to Raise Responsiveness to the Reality of Human
Variability, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 363, 389 (2012). See Press Release, U.S. Food &
Drug Admin., FDA Completes Final Phase of Planning for Consolidation of Certain
Products
from
CBER
to CDER
(Mar.
17,
2003),
http://www3.scienceblog.com/community/older/archives/M/2/fda1387.htm.
In
2016, the biotechnology industry’s trade organization, the Biotechnology Industry
Organization, changed its name to the Biotechnology Innovation Organization. See
generally
BIOTECHNOLOGY
INNOVATION
ORGANIZATION
(“BIO”),
http://www.bio.org (last visited Oct. 13, 2018).
173. The author relies on his observation working for the Massachusetts
Biotechnology Council from 1997 to 1998, and industry interactions and observations
thereafter.
174. Id.
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highly addictive nature, has proven a profitable business.175 Those in
the biopharmaceutical industry responsible for the opioid supply, and
who are major contributors to and beneficiaries of the crisis, have
demonstrated enormous influence. 176
As an added expression of commitment to incentivize industry,
Congress should build upon agency self-initiatives and provisions in
the Addiction and Recovery Act, Cures Act, and Budget Act of 2018
that prioritize opioid crisis funding. Specifically, the APPP should
include provisions that further and more specifically mandate that
federal agencies prioritize opioid-crisis responsiveness and painpathway science and technology when funding grant applications and
entering into Cooperative Research and Development Agreements
with industry.177 Congress also should add provisions that direct the
FDA to use familiar industry incentives within its purview, such as the
fast track for innovative new drugs, to prioritize and advance APPP’s
objectives. Congress also should add a market exclusivity to the some
fifteen it has authorized the FDA to issue focused on industry
responsiveness to the opioid crisis. 178 Finally, Congress should
consider introducing tax incentives such as those used to promote
research and development of orphan (small disease group) drugs, and

175. Consider, for example, the financial success of the McKesson
Corporation. See supra notes 102–109 and accompanying text.
176. Consider Congress’s quiet passage of the Access Act in the midst of media
attention on the severity of the nation’s opioid crisis. See supra notes 110–112 and
accompanying text.
177. The APPP should encompass and enhance initiatives such as the Brain
Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) Initiative, a
progeny of HGP. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., What is the
Brain Initiative?, NAT’L INSTS. ON HEALTH, https://www.braininitiative.nih.gov/ (last
visited Oct. 13, 2018); see also Courtney Humphries, Mapping the Way to a Brain
Survey,
HARV.
MAG.
(July–Aug.
2013),
https://harvardmagazine.com/2013/07/mapping-the-way-to-a-brain-survey.
178. MALINOWSKI, supra note 49, at 158–69. Market exclusivities coupled
with other commercial incentives, such as tax breaks, streamlined review and
approval, and expedited FDA responsiveness, have successfully incentivized the
development of orphan drugs, generic drugs, the completion of pediatric studies, and
beyond. See generally id. at 127–69.
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an opioid “new public health” counterpart to the National Vaccine
Injury Program as an additional incentive, given its past success. 179
2. Proposed Supply-Side Provisions
Even if such a project realizes the goal of pain-treatment
alternatives to addictive opioids, the timeframe from bench research to
market approval of innovative biopharmaceuticals exceeds a decade
by most estimates, 180 while the opioid epidemic is ongoing,
catastrophic, and spreading. Prescription opioids with addictive
properties certainly are going to remain in the portfolio of prescription
medications to manage pain for the foreseeable future—as they should,

179. See Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 2(a), 96 Stat. 2049 (2000)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360bb); MALINOWSKI, supra note 49, at 167–69;
see also generally Mark D. Shtilerman, Pharmaceutical Inventions: A Proposal for
Risk-Sensitive Rewards, 46 IDEA 337, 337–39 (2006). The new public health
movement centers on scientific understanding about the determinants of health and
responsive, more utilitarian law and policy interventions based on this level of
understanding. See generally Lindsay F. Wiley, Rethinking the New Public Health,
69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207 (2012); see also Hodge, supra note 160.
180. Malinowski, Government Rx, supra note 93, at 109; Malinowski,
Throwing Dirt, supra note 79, at 659. According to industry, new drugs cost over
$1.2 billion to approve and take more than 15 years to produce, with an extraordinary
failure rate—greater than 80% for drug candidates that actually reach the stage of
human clinical trials. See Ryan Abbott, Big Data and Pharmacovigilance: Using
Health Information Exchanges to Revolutionize Drug Safety, 99 IOWA L. REV. 225,
235 (2013); Steve Morgan et al., The Cost of Drug Development: A Systematic
Review, 100 HEALTH POL’Y 4, 14–16 (2011). It is important to note, however, that
this cost number takes into account the expense of drug failures (the numbers are
comingled into averages and medians), and it is calculated based upon proprietary
data self-reported by industry to the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development,
and on industry-sponsored research. See generally Tufts Ctr. for the Study of Drug
Dev., Sponsored Research, TUFTS UNIV., http://csdd.tufts.edu/sponsored_research
(last visited Oct. 13, 2018). Also, individual new drug cost estimates vary widely,
and those on the biologics forefront (for example, biologics, including biosimilars and
interchangeable drugs) are much more expensive to develop, manufacture, and
deliver (often injections, and with potentially much greater side effects) in patient
care. See MALINOWSKI, supra note 49, at 164–65; Matthew Herper, The Truly
Staggering Cost of Inventing New Drugs, FORBES (Feb. 10, 2012),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/02/10/the-truly-staggering-costof-inventing-new-drugs/ (“The average drug developed by a major pharmaceutical
company costs at least $4 billion, and it can be as much as $11 billion.”).
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given legitimate patient needs. There is no denying, however, that
prescription opioids have been, and are, a (if not the) primary factor
feeding the epidemic, 181 and that they are likely to continue to do so
for the foreseeable future.
As the FDA observed, regulating the supply of prescription
opioids must balance “two complementary principles: that the United
States must deal aggressively with opioid misuse and addiction, and at
the same time, that it must protect the well-being of people
experiencing the devastating effects of acute or chronic pain.” 182
Regulators must achieve balance with the input of patient advocacy
groups, such as the National Cancer Coalition, and the medical
profession, but Congress must grant the FDA the authority to cleanly
strike and enforce that balance. Along with the FDA’s authority,
Congress must act without further delay to elevate DEA and DOJ
authority to regulate physician opioid prescription practices and opioid
manufacturing. Moreover, in the APPP, Congress must legislatively
mandate that these agencies do so with specificity, fund them
accordingly so that they are able, and hold them accountable.
Prohibitions on encroachment on the practice of medicine
constrain the federal government from effectively managing
prescription opioid use.183 The number of annual opioid prescriptions
written in the U.S. now roughly equals the number of adults in the U.S.
population.184 These restrictions on the federal government are relics
of a bygone era of medicine—one predating the proliferation of
managed care, the commercialization of medicine, aggressive patient
consumerism,
and
direct-to-consumer
marketing
by
185
biopharmaceutical companies by decades.
They undermine the
FDA, the mission of which is to keep watch over the prescription drug
market, to the point that addiction to opioids has engulfed the nation.
This legacy embodies deference to the states and trust in them to
license and police the practice of medicine within their jurisdictions,
though states investigate and discipline physicians for allegations of

181. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
182. Califf, Woodcock & Ostroff, supra note 2, at 1480.
183. See supra notes 68–79 and accompanying text.
184. CDC, ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE, supra note 2, at 9–11. See also Califf,
Woodcock & Ostroff, supra note 2, at 1480.
185. See supra notes 68–76 and accompanying text.

1074

The University of Memphis Law Review

Vol. 48

professional misconduct through medical boards and proceedings—
which the medical profession conveniently controls. 186
The medical profession’s influence over policy, as codified
legislation and decades of case law demonstrate, bolstered by the
biopharmaceutical industry’s protection of physicians’ discretion to
prescribe FDA-approved medicines and patient demands, may damn
the nation to continue to drag the cumbersome, antiquated legacy of
prescription deference along in contemporary medicine. Nevertheless,
as former Commissioner Kessler recognized, “[i]n times of crisis,
major change can happen[,]” 187 and we are in the midst of a chronic,
escalating opioid crisis obviously beyond existing governmental
means.188 The opportunity for government and medical profession
intervention has been more than ample over the last several years—
some would argue decades—and the numbers are self-explanatory.
Obviously, neither the federal government nor the states have proven
effective at checking opioid prescription practices, and the medical
profession has proven itself incapable of self-restraint. Although the
FDAAA enhanced the FDA’s muscle and reach, entrenched legal
restraints, norms, and resource limitations—the same impediments and
post-marketing performance insufficiencies that inspired enactment of
the FDAAA in the first place—continue to stymie both.189
The medical profession, which generally opposes practice
guidelines because it views them as encroachments on physician
discretion, has challenged the CDC guideline for prescribing opioids
in favor of education.190 In fact, the nation needs both. The APPP
should include provisions to coordinate and bolster them, and it should
authorize federal agencies to make opioid guidelines mandatory and
enforceable—for example, by conditioning state participation in
Medicaid, Medicare, and other government health-related programs on
implementation. Perhaps as another condition on participation in
government health-related programs, Congress should also require
states to impose opioid and addiction competency mandates on
physicians in accordance with federal criteria as a prerequisite for

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

See STARR, supra note 71, at 21–29, 40–59, 102–12.
Kessler, supra note 3.
See supra Part III.
See generally Evans, supra note 68.
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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prescribing opioids within their jurisdictions. Consistent with other
raging epidemics, the opioid epidemic does not respect state borders.
Addiction and profits ensure the mobility of both patients and pills—
another factor that makes the opioid epidemic truly a national public
health crisis.
Under the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act, the federal government requires all physicians to
be proficient in medical privacy to protect the rights of their patients. 191
Similarly, the federal government should require all physicians to be
proficient about the opioids they prescribe to protect the lives of their
patients. At the present time, multiple agencies beyond the CDC,
including the FDA, the NIDA, the SAMHSA, and the Office of the
Surgeon General, are responsible for physician education. 192 The
FDA’s opioid strategy emphasizes physician education, in part,
because this approach is much less susceptible to political and legal
challenges than directly regulating prescription practices. 193 In our
free-market, deference-to-physicians health care system, reliance on
medical education as a solution to a public health dilemma on the scale
of the opioid epidemic is highly suspect. In fact, restraints on the FDA
in an age of heightened biopharmaceutical innovation and pervasive
marketing arguably have bestowed the biopharmaceutical industry
with the most influential “education” podium. 194 As Dr. Marcia
Angell, former New England Journal of Medicine editor-in-chief and
author of The Truth About Drug Companies, has observed, drug
companies are in the business of selling biopharmaceuticals and
making profits for their investors—not the enterprise of objective,
unbiased medical education.195
Effectively regulating physician opioid prescription practices
certainly would augment the importance of DEA and DOJ regulation
of opioid production. Opioid manufacturing facilities are scaled-up to
meet opioid epidemic supply demands, and meeting those demands has

191. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. 104–191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996).
192. Califf, Woodcock & Ostroff, supra note 2, at 1480; Kessler, supra note 3.
193. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
194. MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES 135–55 (2005);
Malinowski, Doctors, Patients, and Pills, supra note 68, at 1089–99.
195. ANGELL, supra note 194, at 135 (“No one should rely on a business for
impartial evaluation of a product it sells.”).
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proven extraordinarily profitable. 196 The APPP should include
provisions to mandate federal regulation and enforcement at a
heightened level. The political influences that have impeded progress
by allowing the epidemic to gorge on uncontrolled supply, however,
have proven daunting.197 Reminiscent of the nation’s wrangle with the
tobacco industry, necessity has compelled the states to battle the opioid
addiction beast, amassed under the federal government’s watch, in a
litigation forum.198 On February 27, 2018, Attorney General Sessions
announced intentions to file federal counterparts to these state actions,
and also to potentially help them directly. 199 The Federal government
brought and settled the McKesson case, however. 200 The APPP should
include a provision to ensure that the states are supported in their legal
actions and complementary legislative initiatives, and that the support
is substantial and reliable over time.
3. Federal Mandates and Support of State Initiatives
Although there is no practicable grassroots solution to the
opioid crisis, the epidemic is taking place on state soil, where primary
regulation of the practice of medicine and patient treatment resides and
has resided for decades.201 Moreover, states hold extensive public
health and safety powers, and they have demonstrated effective
ingenuity in grappling with the crisis. 202
The APPP or any other federal intervention must wholly utilize
and promote state initiatives through targeted grant funding—
mandates that are much more direct, fully defined, fully funded, and
centrally orchestrated than those under the Addiction and Recovery

196. See supra notes 102–109 and accompanying text (discussing the
McKesson case); supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text (discussing Purdue
Pharma litigation).
197. See, e.g., supra notes 102–109 (discussing the McKesson case); supra
notes 110–112 (discussing the industry-influenced Access Act).
198. Bernstein & Higham, supra note 24.
199. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 102–109 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 160 and accompanying text; see also Wiley, supra note
179.
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Act, the Cures Act, and the Budget Act of 2018. 203 First and foremost,
through grant and Medicaid funding, the federal government must
support treatment facilities and rehabilitation programs that meet
national criteria developed under the APPP and fund the establishment
of new ones. Given the pervasiveness of the opioid epidemic in rural
areas, Congress should immediately remove the Social Security
Administration’s prohibition on allocating federal funding to statesponsored mental-health and substance-abuse-disorder residential
treatment facilities with more than sixteen beds under the provision of
Medicaid law referred to as the “institute for mental disease”
exclusion. 204
Federal intervention also should mandate funding for states’
prescription drug-monitoring programs (“PDMPs”) that meet national
criteria modeled on the most effective state PDMPs at the time APPP
is implemented as a condition for participation in Medicaid and other
federal health-related programs, and Congress should provide grant
funding to enable compliance. Moreover, the federal government
should facilitate coordination among them, as it has done in other
contexts for years—such as the National Practitioner Data Bank
(“NPDB”) and the Health Integrity and Protection Data Bank
(“HIPDB”). 205
Some jurisdictions that the opioid epidemic has particularly
devastated, such as Buffalo, New York, and Stafford Country, New
Hampshire, have introduced drug courts that couple prosecution of
addicts with closely supervised treatment, recovery, and rehabilitation

203. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
204. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 290bb-1(e), 1396d(i) (2012). Congress included this
exclusion in the Social Security Amendments Act of 1965, which created Medicare
and Medicaid, to leave the responsibility and burden of funding mental health services
on state governments. Pub. L. 89-97, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 286, 343–50. See also
generally LEGAL ACTION CTR., THE MEDICAID IMD EXCLUSION : AN OVERVIEW OF
OPPORTUNITIES
FOR
REFORM
(n.d.),
https://lac.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/IMD_exclusion_fact_sheet.pdf.
205. See 45 C.F.R. § 60.1 (2017); cf. George F. Indest III, National Practitioner
Data
Bank
(NPDB)
Update,
THE
HEALTH
L.
FIRM,
https://www.thehealthlawfirm.com/resources/health-law-articles-anddocuments/national-practitioner-data-bank.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2018) (noting
that the Affordable Care Act eliminated the HIPDB and merged it with the NPDB).
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programs.206 Some regional medical centers, such as East Tennessee
Children’s Hospital, have established neonatal intensive care units to
treat neonatal abstinence syndrome involving opioid withdrawal—an
epidemic within the opioid epidemic. 207 Philadelphia, inspired by the
success of Canadian programs such as Vancouver’s, is considering
establishment of safe injection sites to prevent overdose deaths and to
connect addicts with treatment. 208
The federal opioid crisis
intervention should include grant funding for such state and
community programs that meet criteria drawn from need and
experience successes. Exploratory innovative initiatives should be
eligible for federal grant funding as well, perhaps in the form of federal
matching funds, to promote ongoing novel, creative, community, and
state-based “boots on the ground” opioid addiction problem solving.
V. CONCLUSION
The U.S. is addicted to opioids, it has been for many years, and
the crisis has amassed and spun increasingly out of control. 209 The
scope and severity of the addiction, which the CDC has documented
beyond question, poses a national public health emergency that
national and state governments have recognized, and which millions
of citizens—whose numbers are compounding—have experienced. 210
Federal agencies such as the FDA, the nation’s market gatekeeper for

206. Chris Cuomo, Inside with Chris Cuomo: SOS New Hampshire (CNN
television broadcast Oct. 20, 2017). CNN Reporter Chris Cuomo investigated and
reported on New Hampshire’s efforts to grapple with the heightened opioid crisis
within its borders, including introduction of an innovative drug court. Id.
207. See generally PAUL D. WINCHESTER, NEONATAL ABSTINENCE SYNDROME
(2012),
https://www.in.gov/attorneygeneral/files/(edit)Winchester_Neonatal_Abstinence_an
d_Opiate_Prescriptions._12_13_2012_pt.pdf. See also ABC News, Nightline: DrugDependent Infants Detox at Tenn. NICU, YOUTUBE (July 11, 2012, 3:43 PM),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2eP5EnFSG0c.
208. Elana Gordon, What’s Next for “Safe Injection” Sites in Philadelphia?,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2018/01/24/580255140/whats-next-for-safe-injection-sites-in-philadelphia.
209. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., Merica, supra note 31 and accompanying text (reporting on
President Trump’s recognition and declaration of the crisis as a national public health
emergency).
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prescription drugs, have expended an enormous amount of energy and
effort to respond to the opioid crisis while the problem has ballooned
into an ominous national epidemic. 211
This Article has proposed a federal government intervention,
under centralized responsibility and leadership, with three tangible
objectives. These objectives are to (1) advance pain-pathway science
and technology through research and development, (2) control the
supply side of prescription opioid use, and (3) bolster state initiatives
through targeted grant funding and mandates tied to participation in
the federal government’s health-related programs.
In the words of former FDA Commissioner David Kessler,
“Without centralizing responsibility and finding the right leadership,
many of our citizens will be lost.”212 In fact, millions already have
been, many millions more are struggling to find their way, and
countless more will continue to join them indefinitely unless the U.S.
rises to meet its public health and moral responsibilities. Full
acknowledgement of the opioid epidemic without commensurate
action and the funding to make it meaningful is the hollowest, cruelest
form of government hypocrisy.

211.
212.

See supra Part III.
Kessler, supra note 3.

